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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(j). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Closing Resources, an out of state escrow company, voluntarily agreed to act as 
escrow agent on a Utah real estate transaction. The seller of the property, Plaintiff Fort 
Pierce Business Park, is a Utah resident. Closing Resources directed emails to Fort 
Pierce in Utah, confirming acceptance of the deposit of escrowed funds and receipt of the 
underlying purchase agreement. After the buyer defaulted on the transaction, Fort Pierce 
demanded that Closing Resources release the deposit to Fort Pierce. Closing Resources 
directed letters to Fort Pierce in Utah in which Closing Resources refused to release the 
deposit and instead threatened to simply unilaterally release the deposit to the defaulting 
buyer. The sole issue presented is whether Utah has specific personal jurisdiction over 
Closing Resources in litigation concerning entitlement to the deposit? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's decision granting Closing 
Resources' motion to dismiss was a pretrial jurisdictional decision made solely on 
documentary evidence. Therefore, the trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness 
with all factual disputes and inferences resolved in favor of the plaintiff, Fort Pierce. See 
Pohl. Inc. of Am. v. Webelhutbu 2008 UT 89, [^8, 201 P.3d 944; Newavs, Inc. v. 
McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997). 
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Preservation. This issue was preserved below at R. 101-134, 191 and was 
certified by the trial court as a final order for purposes of appeal at R. 178-79. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Statutes and constitutional provisions that are of central importance to this appeal 
are the following: 
UTAH CODE § 78B-3-201 (2008): 
(1) This part is known as the "Nonresident Jurisdiction Act." 
(2) It is declared, as a matter of legislative policy, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This legislative 
action is necessary because of technological progress which has substantially 
increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in increased 
interaction between persons of this state and persons of other states. 
(3) The provisions of this part, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of 
this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
* * * 
UTAH CODE § 78B-3-202 (2008): 
As used in this part: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, 
association, or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of 
a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect 
persons or businesses within the state. 
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* * * 
UTAH CODE § 78B-3-205 (2008), which provides in relevant part: 
[A]ny person or personal representative of the person, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who, in person or through an agent, does any of 
the following enumerated acts is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty; 
* * * 
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1, which provides, in relevant part: 
No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a dispute over Fort Pierce Business Park's entitlement to a 
deposit, as liquidated damages, being held by Closing Resources, an out-of-state escrow 
agent on a failed Utah real estate transaction between Fort Pierce Business Park and ST 
Paper Company. This appeal challenges the trial court's decision to grant Closing 
Resources motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, on the grounds that the 
escrow agent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah for the 
court to exercise jurisdiction over Closing Resources. The trial court's decision on the 
motion to dismiss was a pre-trial decision based entirely on documentary evidence. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Following the failure of a real estate deal, Plaintiff/Appellant Fort Pierce Business 
Park filed suit against Defendant/Appellee Closing Resources as well as against 
Defendant ST Paper Company. [R. 1.] Closing Resources immediately moved to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [R. 87.] The trial court heard oral argument— 
not an evidentiary hearing—following which it granted the motion, based solely on 
documentary evidence. [R. 191, 160.] The trial court then certified its order granting the 
motion to dismiss as final for purposes of appeal under Rule 54(b). [R. 178-79.] Fort 
Pierce timely filed a notice of appeal. [R. 181.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Plaintiff/Appellant Fort Pierce Business Park, LC ("Fort Pierce") is a Utah limited 
liability company with its principal place of business in Washington County. [R. 1.] In 
July 2006, Fort Pierce, as seller, entered into an agreement ("Agreement") with ST Paper 
Company ("ST Paper"), a company doing business in Utah, as buyer, for ST Paper to 
purchase certain real property located in Washington County for approximately $3.5 
million. [R. 3.] Because the property was actually owned by the State of Utah, ultimate 
This statement treats all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and 
considers them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most 
favorable to Fort Pierce, the nonmoving party. Pohl Inc., 2008 UT 89 at ^|2. 
The Agreement is attached at Addendum 1. The Agreement, including all 
amendments thereto, appears in the record at R. 12-44. For ease of reference, we have 
cited the Agreement directly. 
STG 266781.5 4 
conveyance of the property was to be accomplished by a patent signed by the Governor. 
[R. 3, 18; Agreement §§ 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 6.1.] 
The Agreement required ST Paper to deposit the sum of $40,000.00 into escrow. 
[R. 3.] At ST Paper's request [R. 191 Tr. 14:19-25, 15:1-8], the escrow agent for the 
transaction was Defendant/Appellee Closing Resources, LLC ("Closing Resources"). [R. 
3.] Closing Resources is a Maryland company. [R. 2.] Under the terms of the 
Agreement, Fort Pierce and ST Paper agreed that upon signing, the Agreement would 
"constitute Escrow Instructions . . . to Closing Resources, LLC." [R. 13; Agreement § 
1.2.1.] 
The escrow instructions informed Closing Resources that if ST Paper defaulted 
under the Agreement, Fort Pierce could elect to receive the deposit as liquidated 
damages. [R. 17; Agreement § 5.6.] The escrow instructions further directed Closing 
Resources to "surrender the Deposit to Seller upon demand" in the event that Fort Pierce 
elected to accept liquidated damages. [R. 17; Agreement § 5.6.] 
On August 8, 2006, upon receipt of the $40,000.00 deposit from ST Paper, 
Closing Resources sent an email to Fort Pierce's Utah attorney, in Utah, confirming that 
it had received both an original deposit of $40,000.00 into escrow and a copy of the 
Agreement, including the escrow instructions. [R. 117.] Specifically, Closing 
Resources' email stated: "This email is to confirm that Closing Resources, LLC is in 
receipt of the Contract dated 7-14-06 and the deposit check in the amount of $40,000, for 
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the purchase of real property located in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park in St. George, Utah 
by ST Paper Company, LLC." [R. 117.] 
The terms of the Agreement required the closing of the transaction to take place at 
a title company in Utah, and required Closing Resources to deliver the deposit to the title 
company in Utah. See Agreement § 6.3 ("Closing Resources, LLC, shall deliver the 
Deposit to the Title Company"). In addition, the Agreement contained a jurisdiction and 
venue clause specifying the Fifth Judicial District Court in Washington County, Utah, as 
the court with exclusive venue and jurisdiction over any disputes arising under the 
Agreement. See Agreement § 13.5. 
The Agreement was later amended and, pursuant to the amendment, ST Paper 
deposited an additional $40,000.00 with Closing Resources, which now held $80,000.00 
on deposit. [R. 4.] Closing Resources then directed another email to Fort Pierce's 
attorney, in Utah, confirming the receipt of the amendment to the Agreement and the 
additional deposit check of $40,000.00. [R. 118.] 
Prior to the closing date, ST Paper made various requests for extensions, which 
Fort Pierce accommodated. [R. 5.] As the agreed upon closing date of November 16 
drew near, Fort Pierce requested that the Governor of the State of Utah issue the patent 
for the property. [R. 5-6.] The Governor signed the patent on November 9, and the State 
of Utah provided the patent to the Utah based title-company. [R. 5.] ST Paper, however, 
failed to close on the November 16 deadline and thus defaulted under the Agreement. [R. 
6.] The Agreement provided that if ST Paper defaulted, Fort Pierce could elect to retain 
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the deposit as liquidated damages by providing notice of the same to Closing Resources. 
See Agreement § 5.6. If Fort Pierce made such an election and provided such notice to 
Closing Resources, Closing Resources was required to "surrender the Deposit to [Fort 
Pierce] upon demand." Agreement § 5.6. 
In reliance on the liquidated damages provision in the Agreement, Fort Pierce sent 
a letter to Closing Resources giving notice that ST Paper had defaulted and that Fort 
Pierce had elected to receive the deposit as liquidated damages. [R. 6, 121, 124.] The 
letter also directed Closing Resources to surrender the deposit to Fort; Pierce. [R. 121, 
124] Shortly thereafter, in response to Closing Resources' silence, Fort Pierce sent 
another letter to Closing Resources informing it that Fort Pierce expected Closing 
Resources to comply with the terms of the Agreement and thus surrender the deposit to 
Fort Pierce. [R. 6, 121, 126.] 
Closing Resources responded by sending a letter to Fort Pierce indicating that due 
to the dispute between ST Paper and Fort Pierce concerning entitlement to the deposit, 
Closing Resources was not willing to release the deposit to Fort Pierce and would request 
permission to pay the deposit into court if litigation was commenced, allowing the parties 
to resolve the dispute between themselves. [R. 6, 121-122, 128.] Closing Resources 
followed with another letter to Fort Pierce, this time threatening to return the $80,000.00 
deposit to ST Paper within twenty days if there were no developments in the dispute. [R. 
6, 122, 130.] 
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Fort Pierce then filed suit against both ST Paper and Closing Resources in Fifth 
District Court in Washington County, Utah. [R. 1.] With respect to Closing Resources, 
Fort Pierce requested an order and judgment requiring Closing Resources to release the 
deposit to Fort Pierce. [R. 1-9.] Closing Resources was served with the complaint [R. 
45-47] and shortly thereafter filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
[R. 87.] Closing Resources was represented by the same attorneys as ST Paper. [R. 
passim.] 
Included with Closing Resources' motion was an affidavit from its principal, 
Cheryl Rose, which contained generalized statements that Closing Resources has no 
office, mailing address, or employees in Utah, is not licensed to do business in Utah, does 
not pay taxes in Utah, and so on. [R. 97-98.] However, Rose did not dispute the 
specifics of the transaction or Closing Resources' role in the transaction, including that 
Closing Resources served in the role of escrow agent on the transaction; voluntarily 
accepted the deposit of the funds; voluntarily accepted the Agreement; and voluntarily 
directed correspondence to Fort Pierce in Utah. [R. 97-98.] In fact, Rose acknowledged 
that Closing Resources was acting in the capacity as escrow agent for the transaction and 
conceded that Closing Resources was aware the property at issue was located in Utah. 
[R.98; Aff. Rose [^5 (stating "Closing Resources has not acted as escrow agent with 
respect to any property located in Utah, other than the property at issue in the instant 
lawsuit.") (Emphasis added).] 
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The trial court heard oral argument on the motion, and, based solely on the 
documentary evidence in the record granted Closing Resources' motion to dismiss. [R. 
191, 160.] The trial court reasoned that the transaction "has no more to do with Utah 
than it has to do with Alaska other than that's just a name on a paper. For jurisdiction in 
Utah you have to have something other than somebody in Utah sent me something." [R. 
191 Tr. 8:25, 9:1-3.] The trial court thereafter certified its order of dismissal as final 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). [R. 178-179.] Fort Pierce now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This was not a case of "someone from Utah sent me something." Closing 
Resources voluntary agreed to serve as the escrow agent for a Utah real estate 
transaction. The property is in Utah; the property owner is the State of Utah; the seller is 
a Utah resident; the closing was to take place in Utah; and the underlying agreement, 
which included the escrow instructions, contains a Utah choice of forum clause. 
Contrary to the trial court's opinion—this case has everything to do with Utah. 
The "constitutional touchstone" of due process is "whether the defendant 
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' with the forum State." Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945)). In determining whether a defendant's forum related activities establish 
minimum contacts, the overarching issue is one of forseeability—"the defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
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Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)). This standard does not require the defendant to 
actually step foot in the forum state. See SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Am. Superabrasives, 
Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998). Rather, personal jurisdiction exists if the 
defendant's actions "are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of [the forum] State.'" 
Id at 435 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476). 
In the course of acting as escrow agent, Closing Resources purposefully directed 
its conduct to Utah. This included emails to Fort Pierce in Utah, acknowledging receipt 
of the underlying agreement; a letter to Fort Pierce flatly refusing Fort Pierce's request to 
release the deposit; and finally another letter threatening to unilaterally release the deposit 
to ST Paper. This action forced Fort Pierce to sue Closing Resources to obtain the 
deposit. In addition, as the escrow agent on this transaction, Closing Resources 
contracted to supply escrow services in Utah and voluntarily assumed fiduciary duties to 
its Utah principal—Fort Pierce. It could therefore reasonably anticipate that it could be 
haled into court in Utah on this transaction. 
Closing Resources' actions were purposefully directed towards Fort Pierce in 
Utah. In light of Closing Resources' contacts with Utah and its status as escrow agent on 
the Utah real estate transaction, the trial court's decision that Closing Resources could not 
have reasonably anticipated being haled into Utah on this very transaction was wrong. 
Closing Resources has sufficient minimum contacts with Utah such that it should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. Therefore, the trial court should be 
reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION: A TWO PART INQUIRY 
At issue in this appeal is whether Utah has specific personal jurisdiction over 
Closing Resources under the circumstances of this case. "'[Sjpecific personal 
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to claims arising out 
of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum state5 and only if the defendant 
has 'certain minimum local contacts.5" Pohl Inc. of Am. v. Webelhuth, 2008 UT 89, 
IflO, 201 P.3d 944 (quoting Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 
1122 (Utah 1992)). Specific personal jurisdiction is determined by a two part inquiry. 
See id. "First, do [the plaintiffs] claims arise from one of the activities listed in the 
[long-arm] statute,5 and second, whether the 'defendant's contacts with this forum [are] 
sufficient to satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.555 Id (quoting 
Anderson v. Am. Soc5y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d at 826). 
Fort Pierce need only demonstrate "a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction,55 to defeat Closing Resources5 challenge to the court's jurisdiction. Neways, 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court previously indicated that the due process analysis 
should be conducted first because satisfying due process standards also satisfies the long-
arm statute. See SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Am. Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 
(Utah 1998). However, in its most recent pronouncement on the specific jurisdiction test 
the Court made clear that "[i]n determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, our 
analysis begins with the long-arm statute. ' If the relevant state statute does not permit 
jurisdiction, then the inquiry is ended; if it does, then the question is whether the statute's 
reach comports with due process.555 Pohl Inc., 2008 UT 89 at ^10 (quoting Arguello, 838 
P.2d at 1122). See also Pohl, Inc. of Am. v. Webelhuth, 2007 UT App 225, W9-20, 164 
P.3d 225 (Orme, J., dissenting) (recognizing that court should consider long arm statute 
prior to engaging in due process inquiry), rev W Pohl, Inc., 2008 UT 89. Following Pohl, 
this brief begins with an analysis of Utah's long-arm statute. 
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Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997). And because the trial court's 
decision granting the motion to dismiss was made solely on documentary evidence, all 
facts alleged in the complaint, all factual disputes, and all inferences are to be made in 
favor of Fort Pierce. See Pohl Inc.. 2008 UT 89 at Tf8; Newavs, Inc., 950 P.2d at 422; 
Anderson v. Am. Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 
1990). Against these standards, the trial court's decision to allow Closing Resources to 
escape the reach of this state's courts should be reversed. 
I. CLOSING RESOURCES BOTH TRANSACTED BUSINESS WITHIN AND 
CONTRACTED TO SUPPLY SERVICES IN UTAH THEREBY PLACING 
IT WITHIN THE REACH OF UTAH'S LONG ARM STATUTE. 
Utah's long-arm statute provides that the jurisdiction of Utah's courts will be 
extended over any person where the claim arises out of or is related to "the transaction of 
any business within this state" or the "contracting to supply services or goods in this 
state". Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205(l), (2) (Supp. 2008). Closing Resources has done 
both. 
A. Closing Resources Transacted Business Within Utah. 
Utah Code section 78B-3-202 defines the "transaction of business within this 
state" to mean "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this 
state which affect persons or businesses within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
202(2) (Supp. 2008). Under this broad definition, it is not necessary for a party to 
actually set foot in Utah in order to transact business here. See SII MegaDiamond Inc. v. 
Am. Superabrasives, Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998). Rather, as Closing 
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Resources did in this case, a party may transact business within the state remotely by mail 
or electronic communication. See id. at 434-35. '"So long as a commercial actor's 
efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of [Utah], we have consistently 
rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction 
[]here."' Id at 435 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 
(1985)). See also Fenn v. Mleads Enters., Inc., 2006 UT 8, ^12, 137 P.3d 706 
("Traditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to conduct 
business with foreign residences, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper[.]") 
(quotation omitted)). 
Here, Closing Resources reached beyond its borders and transacted business in 
Utah. It sent communications by both email and mail to Fort Pierce in Utah. In 
accepting the role as escrow agent, Closing Resources knew that it would be required to 
direct its activities into Utah and for the benefit of a Utah resident—it was, after all, the 
escrow agent in a transaction for the sale of real property in Utah in which the seller, Fort 
Pierce, was a Utah resident, the State of Utah itself was the property owner, and the final 
transaction was to occur in the office of a Utah title company. This constitutes the 
transaction of business in Utah for purposes of Utah's long-arm statute. See, e.g., 
Neways, Inc., 950 P.2d at 424 (holding the defendant's telephone calls, acceptance of a 
single check, and wire transfers to Utah constituted transaction of business within Utah 
for purposes of the long arm statute." (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (now codified 
at § 78B-3-205)). 
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This conclusion is bolstered by the legislative mandate that courts apply Utah's 
long-arm statute "to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this state," Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-3-201(3), and the Legislature's broad definition of transacting business 
within Utah to mean any "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives 
in this state which affect persons or businesses within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
3-202(2). Certainly Closing Resources engaged in activities that would affect Fort Pierce 
within Utah. It knew or should have known that its refusal to release the deposit to Fort 
Pierce and its direct threat—communicated by letter to Fort Pierce in Utah—would 
adversely affect Fort Pierce in Utah and force Fort Pierce to file suit in the state of Utah. 
Closing Resources' activity places it squarely within the behavior that the 
Legislature intended to reach through Utah's long-arm statute. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-3-201(2) (declaring the policy of Utah to "provide its citizens with an effective 
means of redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal 
contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. 
This legislative action is necessary because of technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in 
increased interaction between persons of this state and persons of other states."). 
B. Closing Resources Contracted to Supply Services in Utah. 
In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court gave considerable weight to the 
fact that Closing Resources did not actually sign the Agreement. [R. 191 Tr. 7:23-25, 
8:1-7.] But Closing Resources' signature on the Agreement is irrelevant to the 
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jurisdictional question. It is undisputed that Closing Resources voluntarily accepted the 
deposit of funds from ST Paper pursuant to the Agreement; accepted the Agreement 
which contained the escrow instructions detailing Closing Resources' duties to the 
parties; and even acknowledged in a sworn affidavit that it acted as the escrow agent in 
this transaction, which it knew was a Utah transaction. [R. 98.] 
A valid escrow agreement cannot exist without an underlying contract. See JOYCE 
PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 20:3, at 20-6, 7 (2002) ("A valid underlying contract 
is required to support an escrow agreement.").4 And the escrow company is not required 
to actually sign the escrow agreement. Rather, an escrow contract typically takes the 
form of written instructions which may be contained within the underlying real estate 
contract—much like the Agreement at issue here. See PALOMAR, § 20:3, at 20-8 ("The 
parties to an escrow usually give the depositary specific written instructions setting forth 
the terms for the escrow arrangement. Nevertheless, the instructions may be oral, though 
oral instructions will not be permitted to modify written instructions. Instructions also 
may be implied from the express instructions given to the escrow holder."). Here, it is 
undisputed that the Agreement, which Closing Resources accepted and acknowledged, 
and at least for a time acted under, constituted the escrow instructions for the transaction. 
See Agreement § 1.2.1. 
Closing Resources cannot both concede that it was the escrowr agent on this 
transaction, which it knew could only be performed in Utah, and at the same time claim 
4
 For the Court's convenience, we have attached cited portions of Professor 
Palomar's treatise, TITLE INSURANCE LAW, at Addendum 4. 
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there is no contract to supply services in Utah. These two positions cannot co-exist. 
Having conceded it was the escrow agent for the failed Utah real estate transaction 
underlying this dispute, Closing Resources has necessarily conceded it contractually 
bound itself to perform services in Utah pursuant to the written instructions contained in 
the Agreement. 
Under the terms of the Agreement itself, the parties stipulated that Closing 
Resources would supply services to the parties in Utah. Among other things, the 
Agreement required Closing Resources to deliver the deposit to the Utah based title 
company when the transaction closed. See Agreement § 6.3 (stating "Closing Resources, 
LLC, shall deliver the Deposit to the Title Company"). Moreover, in the event the 
transaction fell apart—as it eventually did—Closing Resources retained the duty to 
continue to supply services in Utah, to a Utah resident, by continuing to work with Fort 
Pierce to resolve Fort Pierce's right to the deposit as liquidated damages. See, e.g.. 
Agreement §§ 5.2 & 5.6 (requiring Closing Resources to direct conduct to Utah by 
returning funds and documents in the event of a default). See also Town of Haverhill v. 
City Bank & Trust Co., 402 A.2d 185, 187 (N.H. 1979) (reasoning that although out of 
state escrow company's work would be done in Massachusetts, it was connected to a 
contract to be performed at least in part in New Hampshire and therefore escrow 
company contracted to supply services in New Hampshire for purposes of the long arm 
statute). 
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In sum, the only way for Closing Resources to fulfill its obligations as escrow 
agent was to supply services within Utah pursuant to its escrow agreement. Again, this is 
conduct that places Closing Resources squarely within the behavior that the Legislature 
intended to reach through Utah's long-arm statute. 
II. CLOSING RESOURCES HAS SUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS 
WITH UTAH TO SATISFY FEDERAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. 
A. The "Constitutional Touchstone" of Due Process in the Context of 
Specific Jurisdiction is "Whether the Defendant Purposefully 
Established 'Minimum Contacts' in the Forum State."5 
"Federal due process requires that in order to subject a defendant to specific 
personal jurisdiction, there must be 'certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.'" Pohl Inc., 2008 UT 89 at j^23 (quoting IntT Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945)). Requiring minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum 
state ensures "that courts only exert jurisdiction in cases where the defendant creates a 
'substantial connection with the forum state' such that the defendant 'should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there.'" IcL (quoting MFS Series Trust III, 2004 UT 61, 
^|10,96P.3d927). 
There is no rigid test with which to analyze minimum contacts. Instead, a 
defendant's '"contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.'" Id (quoting 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)). "Tn judging minimum contacts, a court 
5
 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
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properly focuses on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation.555" Id at |^24 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 204 (1977))). Due process does not turn on "the quantity of the contacts with 
the state, but 'rather upon the quality and nature5 of the minimum contacts and their 
relationship to the claim asserted.'5 Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1123 (quoting International 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added)). Rather, "[t]he essential question is whether the 
defendant purposefully and voluntarily directed] his activities toward the forum so that 
he should expect.. . to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on his contacts with 
the forum." Pohl Inc., 2008 UT 89 at |^24 (alteration original) (citation omitted). 
"Finally, even if there are minimum contacts, 'the concept of fair play and 
substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has 
purposefully engaged in forum activities.5" Pohl Inc., 2008 UT 89 at TJ23 (quoting MFS 
Series Trust III 2004 UT 61 at *[|10). As set forth below, Closing Resources has 
sufficient minimum contacts with Utah to satisfy federal due process requirements and 
substantial justice will be served by allowing Fort Pierce to pursue its remedies against 
Closing Resources here in Utah. 
B. Closing Resources Should Reasonably Anticipate being Haled into 
Court in Utah on this Specific Transaction. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that 
[b]y requiring that individuals have "fair warning that a particular activity may 
subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,55 the Due Process Clause 
"gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential 
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit[.]55 
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Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)). 
Thus, for example, a defendant cannot be haled into a foreign jurisdiction based 
solely on the "unilateral activity" of another. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474. The 
transaction at issue in this case, however, did not fall out of the skies over Maryland into 
Closing Resources' lap. Rather, Closing Resources voluntarily entered into this 
transaction; voluntarily accepted the position of escrow agent; voluntarily accepted the 
terms of the Agreement; and voluntarily accepted the terms of the escrow instructions, 
which included duties to the parties to be performed in the state of Utah. And by doing 
so, Closing Resources purposefully, voluntarily, and knowingly directed its activities 
towards Utah and could reasonably anticipate that it could be haled into a Utah court for 
problems arising from this transaction. 
Specifically, and as detailed more fully below, Closing Resources (1) knew that 
this was a Utah based real estate transaction that required Closing Resources to direct its 
conduct to Utah; (2) as an escrow agent, Closing Resources had a fiduciary duty to its 
Utah principal, Fort Pierce, thus giving Closing Resources fair warning that its conduct 
on this transaction could land it in a Utah courtroom; and (3) the Agreement contained a 
forum selection clause specifying Utah as the exclusive forum for disputes concerning the 
transaction. Thus, Closing Resources "purposefully and voluntarily directed] his 
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activities toward the forum" and otherwise "should expect.. . to be subject to the court's 
jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum." Pohl Inc., 2008 UT 89 at ^ [24. 
1. Closing Resources knew that this transaction, by its very nature, was 
to be performed in Utah and required Closing Resources to 
purposefully direct its conduct to Utah. 
First, the following undisputed facts show that Closing Resources purposefully 
directed its activities to Utah and that Closing Resources should have reasonably 
anticipated being haled into a Utah court for any problems arising from this transaction: 
• Closing Resources accepted ST Paper's $40,000.00 deposit and sent an 
email to Fort Pierce in Utah confirming that it had received both the deposit 
into escrow and a copy of the Agreement. Indeed, the email itself 
acknowledges that the transaction is for "the purchase of real property 
located in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park in St. George, Utah" [R. 117.] 
• Closing Resources acknowledges that it was acting as escrow agent for this 
transaction and knew that the property at issue was located in Utah. [R. 98 
(stating "Closing Resources has not acted as escrow agent with respect to 
any property located in Utah, other than the property at issue in the instant 
lawsuit.") (Emphasis added).] 
• Closing Resources accepted ST Paper's additional $40,000.00 deposit and 
sent another email to Fort Pierce in Utah confirming that it had received 
both the additional deposit of funds into escrow and a copy of the 
amendment to the Agreement. 
• The Agreement, which served as the escrow instructions to Closing 
Resources (at § 1.2.1) required Closing Resources to surrender the deposit 
to Fort Pierce on demand, if Fort Pierce elected to retain the deposit as 
liquidated damages in the event of ST Paper's default. See Agreement § 
5.6 (providing "If [Fort Pierce] elects to accept liquidated damages, Closing 
Resources, LLC, shall surrender the Deposit to [Fort Pierce] upon demand. 
• The Agreement also required Closing Resources to pay the deposit to Fort 
Pierce in the even the Agreement was properly terminated by Fort Pierce. 
See Agreement § 5.2 ("If this Agreement is properly terminated by [Fort 
Pierce] as provided in Section 5.1, Closing Resources, LLC, shall pay the 
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Deposit to [Fort Pierce]"). 
• Fort Pierce made several written demands on Closing Resources that ST 
Paper had defaulted and requesting that Closing Resources send Fort Pierce 
the deposit as required by the Agreement. Closing Resources responded to 
this demand, by directing a letter to Fort Pierce indicating that due to the 
dispute as to which party breached the Agreement, Closing Resources was 
not willing to release the deposit to either Fort Pierce or ST Paper and 
would request permission of the court to pay the deposit into court if 
litigation was commenced. 
• Closing Resources then sent another letter to Fort Pierce this time 
threatening to simply release the $80,000.00 deposit to ST Paper. 
The trial court refused to accept that these facts demonstrated sufficient minimum 
contacts to subject Closing Resources to Utah jurisdiction. It demanded more. [R. 191 
Tr. 9:22-25, 10:1.] But what more could be expected of an out of state escrow other than 
its acceptance of the role of escrow agent its unequivocal acceptance of the escrow 
instructions; its decision to direct communications to the Utah, the forum state, 
confirming receipt of escrowed funds; its acceptance and acknowledgment of the 
underlying agreement, and thereafter directing communications concerning the escrow 
pursuant to the escrow instructions within the Agreement. 
These acts are exactly the type, nature, and number of contacts one would expect 
of an escrow agent in Closing Resources position on such a transaction. Indeed, 
"[a]nalyzing cthe quality and nature' of the minimum contacts and their relationship to 
the claim asserted,'" Lee v. Frank's Garage & Used Cars, Inc., 2004 UT App 260, [^15, 
97 P.3d 717 (quoting Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1123), it becomes clear that the contacts 
between Closing Resources and Fort Pierce were related directly to the claim Fort Pierce 
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ultimately asserted—entitlement to the deposit that Closing Resources holds as escrow 
agent pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. Affirming the trial court's decision will 
necessarily remove any and all out-of-state escrow agents who volunteer to act as escrow 
agents for Utah real estate transactions from the reach of this state's courts. 
Further, Closing Resources went beyond the steps necessary to complete its role as 
escrow agent for this transaction: it sent an additional communication to Fort Pierce in 
Utah threatening to release the funds to ST Paper, an act that would irreparably harm Fort 
Pierce. This action was akin to firing a shot across Fort Pierce's bow—knowing full well 
that Fort Pierce is docked in Utah. The claims against Closing Resources for the deposit 
arise directly from Closing Resources' contacts with Utah, specifically its flat refusal to 
release the deposit to Closing Resources. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, this 
contact satisfies due process requirements. See Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1123 (explaining 
that specific jurisdiction is proper where litigation in forum state "arises out o f and is 
therefore related to the contacts with the forum state). 
2. As the escrow agent on a Utah real estate transaction with fiduciary 
duties to a Utah resident Closing Resources had fair warning that its 
conduct on this transaction could land it in a Utah courtroom. 
In addition, a minimum contacts analysis should take into account contemplated 
future consequences of the particular transaction at issue. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 
479 (stating "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the 
terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing—that must be evaluated in 
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determining whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the 
forum."). 
The trial court based its decision on the erroneous premise that this was just an 
ordinary commercial transaction. [R. 191 Tr. 10:14-21 (likening this transaction to 
purchasing maple syrup in Vermont, reasoning that "if there is something wrong with the 
maple syrup then I better go where the syrup came from")]. But this was not an ordinary 
commercial transaction for the sale of goods in interstate commerce and Closing 
Resources is not an ordinary commercial actor involved in an arm's length transaction. 
As the escrow agent on the transaction Closing Resources assumed a fiduciary 
responsibility to each party to the transaction. See Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (stating "it is well established that an escrow agent assumes 
the role of the agent of both parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a 
high standard of care in dealing with its principals"); PALOMAR, § 20:3, at 20-6 ("upon 
accepting a purchase contract for escrow or closing, a title company assumes a duty to 
follow all explicit and implied instructions for escrow and closing and to perform all 
services undertaken with the skill and diligence reasonably expected of a real estate 
professional. . . [and] . . . will be liable in contract for breaching any escrow or closing 
instructions and in tort for failing to exercise ordinary skill and diligence in any aspect of 
its employment."). 
Closing Resources made a choice to act as escrow agent for a Utah based real 
estate transaction—it was not forced into that role. It knew (or at the very least should 
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have known) that by doing so it was accepting a fiduciary relationship with Fort Pierce, a 
Utah resident, on a transaction for the sale of real property in Utah. It knew that if it 
breached the escrow agreement by refusing to release the deposit to Fort Pierce, as 
required as a result of ST Paper's default, its refusal would be felt by Fort Pierce in Utah. 
And it did ignore Fort Pierce's demand, the consequences of which were felt directly by 
Fort Pierce in Utah. That is sufficient for jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burger King Corp., 471 
U.S. at 480 (finding jurisdiction in Florida because, among other things, the out-of-state 
defendant's breach "caused foreseeable [economic] injuries to the corporation in 
Florida"). 
And if that were not enough, Closing Resources knew that after accepting the 
deposit and escrow instructions, its involvement would not end by that mere acceptance. 
It knew that its Utah principal might later instruct it—as Fort Pierce later did—to release 
the deposit to Fort Pierce. See Agreement §§ 5.3, 5.6. Closing Resources knew that to 
consummate the transaction would require Closing Resources to deliver the deposit to the 
title company in Utah. See Agreement § 6.3 (at closing "Closing Resources, LLC, shall 
deliver the Deposit to the Title Company . . ."). And it knew or should have known that 
by creating the fiduciary relationship with Fort Pierce, a Utah resident, it could be held 
liable to Fort Pierce in Utah in the event it breached any escrow instructions or otherwise 
failed to exercise ordinary skill and diligence in any aspect of its employment as the 
escrow agent. See PALOMAR, § 20:3, at 20-6. 
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At its core, the Due Process Clause protects foreign entities from being haled into 
foreign jurisdictions based on "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts. See 
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 480. There is nothing random, fortuitous, or attenuated 
about Closing Resources contacts with and obligations to the state of Utah. To the 
contrary, under these circumstances, Closing Resources can hardly be surprised when 
Fort Pierce hales it into a Utah court after it not only fails to adhere to Fort Pierce's 
demands to release the deposit pursuant to the Agreement but also threatens to release it 
to ST Paper, the defaulting party. See, e.g., SII MegaDiamond, Inc., 969 P.2d at 435-36 
("any nonresident business that confirms that it intends to act as a national and 
international distributor for a Utah business and then places hundreds of purchase orders 
for goods that are to be shipped and invoiced from Utah, with foil knowledge that it must 
perform its part of the bargain by paying for the goods in Utah[,] should not be surprised 
when it gets haled into court after it fails to pay no fewer than 170 invoices."). Closing 
Resources' contacts with Utah simply do not qualify as random, fortuitous, or attenuated 
contact deserving of protection under the Due Process Clause and the trial court was 
wrong in allowing Closing Resources to escape its jurisdiction on such grounds. 
Because Closing Resources had knowledge that its acts could injure Fort Pierce in 
Utah, Utah can and should exercise jurisdiction over Closing Resources. See Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785-87 (1984), accord Fenn, 2006 UT 8 at TJ14. 
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3. There is a forum selection clause specifying Washington County, 
Utah as the exclusive forum for disputes arising under the 
Agreement. 
Finally, the Agreement itself contained a forum selection clause, which provides: 
"This Agreement shall be construed under the laws of the State of Utah in effect at the 
time of the signing of this Agreement. The parties consent to the jurisdiction of the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Washington County, Utah." Agreement § 13.5. In Phone 
Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that: 
while a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause by itself is not 
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a matter of 
law, such clauses do create a presumption in favor of jurisdiction and will 
be upheld as fair and reasonable so long as there is a rational nexus between 
the forum selected and/or consented to, and either the parties to the contract 
or the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract. 
Id at Tf 14. 
As set forth above, the Agreement contained the escrow instructions. And, again, 
although Closing Resources did not actually sign the Agreement, as a matter of law, its 
acceptance of the escrow instructions contained within the Agreement created a contract 
between it and its principals—Fort Pierce and ST Paper. The selection of Utah as the 
forum for disputes under the Agreement certainly has a rational nexus to the transaction 
that is the subject of the transaction—the sale of property in Utah. At the very least, 
Closing Resources, by its silence on the subject, fairly can be said to have given its 
implied consent to the jurisdiction of the Fifth District Court. Cf, Burger King Corp., 471 
U.S. at 472 n.14 (noting that "because the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable 
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right, there are a variety of legal arrangements by which a litigant may give express or 
implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.") (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
If Closing Resources did not want to subject itself to the jurisdiction of Utah's 
courts on this transaction, it should not have agreed to serve as the escrow agent, or, at a 
minimum, should have objected to that term when it accepted the Agreement. The trial 
court apparently grounded its decision in the rationale that Closing Resources did not 
have a choice. [R. 191 Tr. 8:12-18 (stating "what was [Closing Resources'] choice? . . . 
receive it in the mail then do what, throw it out the window? Bum it? . . . It's got Utah 
jurisdiction dripping on it. We have to get rid of it somehow?").] But this rationale is 
flawed. Closing Resources absolutely had a choice. It could have sent the deposit and 
Agreement back to the parties. It did not. If it desired to serve as escrow agent but did 
not want to be haled into Utah, it could have and should have attempted to negotiate for a 
non-Utah forum in relation to claims that might be asserted against it as escrow agent. 
See, e.g., Lee, 2004 UT App 260 at [^14 n.6 (suggesting that a foreign resident "could 
have contracted for a non-Utah forum if it desired to avoid the potential of litigation in 
Utah."). It did not, and its effort to object to jurisdiction only after Fort Pierce filed its 
suit should be rejected as too late. 
In sum, Closing Resources voluntarily agreed to be a party to this transaction and 
now, faced with the specter of defending itself in Utah, it cannot wield the Due Process 
Clause as a shield to avoid the obligations that it voluntarily assumed. See Burger King 
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Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (stating "the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a 
territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed."). 
C. Exercise of Jurisdiction is Reasonable and Comports with Traditional 
Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice. 
The only remaining question is whether exercising jurisdiction would be 
consistent with notions of "fair play and substantial justice." Pohl, Inc., 2008 UT 89 at 
Tf23. The answer is yes. In Burger King Corp., the United States Supreme Court 
explained that "[a] State generally has a 'manifest interest5 in providing its residents with 
a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors." 471 U.S. at 
473. Here, the trial court has jurisdiction over the other parties to the suit, Fort Pierce and 
ST Paper, and will be called upon to address the competing claims of breach that Fort 
Pierce and ST Paper have lodged against one another—both claiming entitlement to the 
deposit that (so far as Fort Pierce knows) Closing Resources is still holding.6 Those 
competing claims will be tried in Washington County. It makes no sense at all to require 
Fort Pierce to travel across the country to file an action in Maryland simply to protect the 
deposit that was placed in Closing Resources' custody, thereby litigating the same claims 
in two forums. 
The Supreme Court also explained that where individuals purposefully derive 
benefits from interstate activities, as Closing Resources did here, "it may well be unfair to 
allow them to escape having to account in other States for consequences that arise 
ST Paper has asserted counterclaims against Fort Pierce laying its own claim to 
the deposit. [R. 56-59.] 
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proximately from such activities[.]" Id, at 474. Finally, the Court stated that "because 
'modern transportation and communications have made it much less burdensome for a 
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity,' it usually 
will not be unfair to subject him to the burdens of litigating in another forum for disputes 
relating to such activity." IcL at 474 (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 
223 (1957)). 
Closing Resources has not offered a single affidavit or other sworn testimony— 
nor even argued—that it would be inconvenient or burdensome for it to litigate this case 
in Utah. There is no reason why it would. The only potential witness for Closing 
Resources is Cheryl Rose and her emails and affidavit make plain that she knew this was 
a Utah transaction. Under the facts of this case, there is nothing fundamentally unfair 
about requiring Closing Resources to come to Utah to defend its actions in this case. It 
is, after all, holding $80,000 that belongs to Fort Pierce. 
Indeed, one wonders why Closing Resources has not simply deposited the funds 
into court in Utah as it initially indicated it would. Perhaps the answer to this question 
lies in the fact that Closing Resources' last action in its dealings with its principal Fort 
Pierce was to threaten to unilaterally release the deposit to ST Paper. Then, after being 
served with Fort Pierce's lawsuit, a lawsuit that Closing Resources invited, Closing 
Resources shows up in court represented by the same attorneys as ST Paper—not 
independent counsel. An independent fiduciary cannot pick sides between two 
principals, see, e.g., PALOMAR, § 20:3, at 20-4 & n.l (collecting cases), but, for whatever 
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reasons, Closing Resources has chosen sides—and it cannot now complain that it would 
be unfair and burdensome to come to Utah to answer for it. 
Accordingly, this Court's exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and comports with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of Closing Resources should be reversed. 
DATED THIS JL6 day of May 2009. 
DURHAM JONES & PEVEGAR, P.C. 
BRYAN JUPATTISON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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REAL PROPERTY SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMEN1 
This is an agreement (ttAgreement?) for the sale and purchase of real 
property located in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park in St. George, Utah. The 
date of this Agreement, the parties to this Agreement and certain other terms 
used in this Agreement are listed following this beginning paragraph. The 
italicized terms tha t are in quotation marks are used elsewhere in this 
Agreement and have the meanings or definitions indicated. 
Date: July tf. 2006 
"Seller*: Fort Pierce Business Park, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company 
"Buyer": ST Paper Company, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company 
"Property*: See Exhibit A attached 
"Price perAcn?: $90,000.00 
Estimated total price: $3,536,370.00 
"Deposif: $40,000.00 
"Intended Lfee" The intended use is for a manufacturing and 
distribution facility. 
"Feasibility 
Period9 The period of time commencing on the date indicated 
above and ending 120 days later. 
"Seller's Realtor*: Commerce CRG 
"Buyer's Realtof: none 
"Title Compamf: Southern Utah Title Company 
"Closing Date?: November 16, 2006 
Number of addenda attached: none 
1 
1. Purchase, 
1.1 Agreement to Purchase Property. Seller agrees to sell the 
Property to Buyer and Buyer agrees to purchase the Property from Seller. The 
total purchase price for the Property (the "Purchase Pried') shall be determined 
by the actual number of acres in the Property multiplied by the Price per Acre. 
The Price per Acre shall be prorated for partial acres. The estimated total price 
stated above assumes tha t t he Property consists of a certain number of acres. 
The Purchase Price will be based on the actual number of acres, a s determined 
by the survey referred to in Section 2 .1 . Anything herein to the contrary 
notwithstanding, unless this Agreement is terminated previously by Buyer, 
Seller shall not offer, sell or agree to sell the Property to any party other than 
Buyer, prior to the date scheduled as the Closing Date. 
1.2 Payment of Purchase Price. The Purchase Price shall be paid 
as follows: 
1.2.1. Buyer shall pay the Deposit to Closing 
Resources, LLC, 50 W. Edmonston Drive, Suite 600, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, upon execution of this Agreement. The Deposit shall be made by 
Buyer's check. All interest earned on the Deposit shall accrue to and be the 
property of Buyer. This Agreement when signed by Buyer and Seller shall also 
constitute Escrow Instructions to the Title Company and to Closing Resources, 
LLC. If any requirements relating to the duties or obligations of the Title 
Company or Closing Resources, LLC, are unacceptable to either of these 
entities, or if either of these entities requires additional instructions, the parties 
agree to make any deletions, substi tutions and additions as counsel for Buyer 
and Seller shall mutually approve and which do not materially alter the terms 
of this Agreement. Any supplemental instructions shall be signed only as an 
accommodation to Title Company or Closing Resources, LLC, as the case may 
be, and shall not be deemed to modify or amend the rights of Buyer and Seller, 
a s between Buyer and Seller, unless these supplemental instructions expressly 
so provide. 
1.2.2. The balance of the Purchase Price [e.g. the 
Purchase Price less the Deposit) shall be delivered to Title Company on or 
before the Closing as provided in Section 6.3, and shall be in immediately 
available funds. 
1.3. Special Limitations on Sale and Purchase. Buyer 
acknowledges and agrees tha t the sale and purchase of the Property is subject 
to the following limitations, in addition to any other limitations contained in 
this Agreement: 
2 
1.3.1. the State of Utah (the *Stater) will reserve from 
the Property all coal and other mineral deposits, along with the right for the 
State, its assigns and other persons authorized by the State to prospect for, 
mine and remove deposits; 
1.3.2. the Property is subject to any valid, existing 
rights-of-way of any kind and to any right, interest, reservation or exception 
appearing of record; 
1.3.3. the Property is subject to all rights-of-way for 
ditches, tunnels, and telephone transmission lines tha t have been or may be 
constructed by the United States as provided by statute; 
1.3.4. the Property will be conveyed to Buyer by Patent 
issued by the State. Buyer acknowledges tha t the Patent is without warranties 
as to the condition of title to the Property; and 
1.3.5. all transactions under this Agreement are 
subject to the rules of the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration and no sale is final and no rights in the Property, including 
rights of possession, shall vest in Buyer until final execution and delivery of the 
Certificate of Sale (as provided in Section 6.1). 
2. Survey; Declaration of Covenants; Option. 
2 .1 . Survey. Seller shall provide Buyer a boundary survey of the 
Property, with all corners staked on the Property, within ten (10) days of the 
date of this Agreement. Buyer may, at its own cost, obtain an AJ>TA survey of 
the Property. 
2.2. Declaration of Covenants, The Property is subject to the 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Fort Pierce Industrial 
Park Phases II, III and IV, as amended (the "Declaration"), which was recorded 
in the office of the Washington County Recorder. Among other things, the 
Declaration permits the Declarant under the Declaration to prepare and record 
one or more plats designating ownership of the various lots in Fort Pierce 
Industrial Park and obligates each owner of property in Fort Pierce Industrial 
Park to give written consent to the preparation and recording of said plat(s). 
2.3. Option. Buyer acknowledges that a primary purpose for the 
establishment of Fort Pierce Industrial Park is to encourage and promote 
economic development in Washington County. In order to accomplish that 
purpose, Buyer further acknowledges that Seller is entitled to place reasonable 
restrictions and obligations on the Property that will encourage development of 
3 
the Property while, at the same time, discourage holding of the Property for 
speculation. To tha t end, Buyer covenants and agrees as follows: 
2 .3 .1 . Within two (2) months of the Closing Date, 
Buyer agrees to submit to the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial 
Park Phase II, III & IV Owners Association the plans and other materials 
described in Section 5.1 of the Declaration for the construction of all facilities 
necessary for the Intended Use (the aFacilities7). 
2.3.2. Buyer shall commence construction of the 
Facilities within two (2) years of the Closing Date and shall complete 
construction of the Facilities within four (4) years of the Closing Date. 
2.3.3. No material portion (more than ten percent 
(10%)) of the Property shall be used for any purpose other than the Intended 
Use within five (5) years of the Closing Date. 
In the event Buyer fails to comply with any of the foregoing covenants, Seller 
may give to Buyer a notice of default. In the case of Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, 
the notice of default shall be given no later tha t ninety (90) days following the 
end of the applicable time period indicated. In the case of Section 2.3.3, the 
notice of default shall be given during the five-year time period. If Buyer fails 
to cure the default within thirty (30) days of the date the notice is given, Seller 
shall, at its discretion, have the option and right to buy back the Property 
(including all improvements on the Property) for the Purchase Price. Notice of 
exercise of t he option shall be given to Buyer no later than ninety (90) days 
following the date the notice of default is given. Closing shall take place at the 
office of the Title Company within thirty (30) days of the date the notice of 
exercise is given. If the notice of exercise is not timely given, the right to buy 
back the Property for the default cited shall expire at the end of tha t ninety-day 
period. In the event Seller shall re-purchase the Property, Seller shall be 
responsible for all closing costs assessed by the Title Company. Buyer shall 
convey the Property to Seller by special warranty deed, free of any lien, 
encumbrance or exception to title placed on the Property subsequent to the 
Closing (defined below). A notice of this option shall be executed by Seller and 
Buyer at the Closing and shall be recorded by the Title Company at the office of 
the Washington County Recorder at the same time tha t the Patent is recorded. 
3. Conditions Precedent to Buyer's Performance. Buyer's obligation 
to purchase the Property is subject to the satisfaction of all the conditions set 
forth below, each of which is for Buyer's benefit, within the time period 
specified. Buyer may waive any condition in writing. 
3 .1 . Feasibility. Buyer shall have until 5:00 p.m. on the last date 
of the Feasibility Period to determine in its sole discretion whether it is feasible 
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to acquire and develop the Property. During the Feasibility Period, Buyer shall 
review and approve title as evidenced by a current preliminary title report (the 
"Preliminary Report!3) to be issued by Title Company and shall review the 
physical condition of the Property, its suitability for building and development 
and its municipal zoning classification... If Buyer determines that it is not 
feasible to acquire and develop the Property, it may terminate this Agreement 
by giving written notice to Seller and Closing Resources, LLC, before the end of 
the Feasibility Period, in. which event the Deposit shall be returned to Buyer 
and Buyer and Seller shall be relieved for all further obligations under this 
Agreement, with the exception of any repair and restoration obligations which 
Buyer ma}7" have under Section 9. If Buyer fails to give such notice before the 
end of the Feasibility Period, this feasibility condition shall be deemed satisfied 
and, except as provided in Section 5.3, the Deposit shall become 
nonrefundable. 
3.2, Delivery of Documents. Seller shall have signed, 
acknowledged and delivered all documents and. inst ruments to the Title 
Company as required in Section 6. 
3- - validity of Representations and Warranties, All 
representations and warranties by Seller in this Agreement, or in any other 
written statement from Seller that is delivered to Buyer under this Agreement, 
shall be t rue as of the Closing as though made at that ^imp 
3.-L lAo Deiaulis by Seller. Seller shall not. be in default under 
• i":. Agreement as of the Closing. 
Conditions precedent to Seller's Performance: The obliga.ti.on of 
Seller to sell the Property is subject to- the satisfaction of all conditions set forth 
below, each of which is for Seller's benefit, within the time period, specified... 
Seller may waive any condition i n writing. 
M.JL. i^clivery of Documents. Buyer shall h ave signed, 
acknowledged and delivered all monies, documents and instruments to the 
Title Company as required in Section. 6. 
4-2. Validity of Representations and Warranties. Ml 
representations and warranties by Buyer in this Agreement, or in any other 
written statement from Buyer that is delivered to Seller under this Agreement, 
shall be tru<- as of the Closing as though made at that time. 
; .o. -so Defaults by Buyer. Buyer shall, not be in default under 
this Agreement as of the Closing. 
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5. Termination of Agreement. 
5 .1 . In addition to Buyer's right to terminate under Section 3 .1 , if 
either Buyer or Seller disapproves any condition referred to in Section 3 or 4 , 
respectively (other t h a n the condition referred to in Section 3.1), tha t party may 
terminate this Agreement by delivering written notice to the other party and to 
the Title Company and to Closing Resources, LLC, on or before the Closing 
Date. 
5.2. If this Agreement is properly terminated by Seller a s 
provided in Section 5 .1 , Closing Resources, LLC, shall pay the Deposit to Seller 
and the Title Company shall re turn all other funds and documents then held 
by it to the party depositing the funds and documents. 
5.3. If this Agreement is properly terminated by Buyer as 
provided in Section 5 .1 , the Title Company and Closing Resources, LLC, shall 
re turn all funds and documents then held by them (including without 
limitation the Deposit) to the party depositing the funds and documents . 
5.4. Termination of this Agreement, as provided in this Section 5, 
shall be without prejudice to whatever legal rights Buyer or Seller may have 
against each other arising from this Agreement. 
5.5. If the Closing fails to occur because of either party 's default, 
the defaulting part shall be liable for all escrow cancellation and Title Company 
charges. If the Closing fails to occur for any other reason, Buyer shall pay any 
escrow cancellation a n d / o r Title Company charges. 
5.6. If Buyer defaults under this Agreement, Seller may elect 
either to receive the Deposit as liquidated damages, or to r e tu rn it and sue 
Buyer to specifically enforce this Agreement or pursue other remedies available 
at law. If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Deposit, Buyer may elect 
either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Deposit as liquidated damages, 
or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Agreement or pu r sue other 
remedies available a t law. If Seller elects to accept liquidated damages , Closing 
Resources, LLC, shall surrender the Deposit to Seller upon demand. If Buyer 
elects to accept liquidated damages, Closing Resources, LLC, shall surrender 
the Deposit to Buyer upon demand and Seller shall pay the liquidated damages 
to Buyer upon demand. IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED BY 
THE PARTIES THAT THE DEPOSIT AMOUNT IS A REASONABLE ESTIMATE 
OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH EITHER PARTY WOULD BE DAMAGED BY THE 
OTHER'S DEFAULT, IN LIGHT OF THE DIFFICULTY THE PARTIES WOULD 
HAVE IN DETERMINING ACTUAL DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF SUCH A 
DEFAULT. 
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6. Closing.. The closing of the. transactions contemplated herein (the 
""Closing") shall take place on the Closing.Date or such earlier date as the 
parties may agree. The place of the Closing shall be a t the office of the Title 
Companv. At r v - Closing the following shall occur: 
6.1 Seller sha 11 deliver to the Title Company a Certnioau; -j ..-^-e 
to the Property duly executed on behalf of the State of Utah. Buyer 
acknowledges that the Certificate of Sale is without warranties a s to the 
conditio^ r.f litle to the Property. 
6.2. Seller and Buyer shall eacn CXCLULC CUJU dchvui LO uie iiiie 
Company a closing statement for the saV and purchase reflecting the following 
adjustments, payments, and credits: 
6.2.1 Seller shall pay the premiums iui a bi^ul- i w 
form owner's protection policy of title insurance issued through the Title 
Company in an amount equal to the Purchase Price, naming Buyer as the 
insured and insuring that title to the Property is vested in Buyer, subject only 
to the exceptions in the Preliminary Report and the matters referred to in 
Section 1.3 (the "Title Policy"). If Buyer requires an ALTA extended policy of 
title insurance, (i) Buyer shall make such selection in a timely manne r so as to 
not interfere with or delay the Closing,, (ii) Seller shall pay the base cost of an 
owner's policy, and (iii) Buyer shall pay the additional cost of obtaining such 
ALTA extended policy including, without limitation, any si irvey costs 
6.2.2. Buyer and Seller shall each pay one-half (V2) of 
the costs of the escrow service fees charged by the Title Company. Seller and 
Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the recording fees and similar charges and 
expenses. Buyer shall, pay all charges assessed by Closing Resources, LLC. 
6.2.3. The Property is currently exempt from property-
taxes. Buyer shall be responsible for all property taxes assessed against the 
Property after the Closing. 
6.3. Closing Resources, LLC, shall deliver the Deposit to ihe 'Title 
Company, and Buyer shall deliver to the Title Company immediately available 
funds in the amount of the Purchase Price, less the Deposit, together with 
sufficient funds to pay Buyer's allocation of the expenses stated in Buyer's 
closing statement. 
o.4. Buyer and bdJcr shall each execute, acknowledge, a nd 
'H.uvci such other documents and instruments and take such other action as 
ih<; Title Company may reasonably require in order to document and carry out 
the transaction contemplated in this Agreement. 
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6.5. Upon receipt of the above funds and documents , the Title 
Company shall disburse the funds as provided in the closing s ta tements and 
shall deliver the Certificate of Sale to Buyer. 
6.6. Possession of the Property shall be delivered to the Buyer at 
the Closing. All warranties and representations of Seller and Buyer, and any 
covenants and obligations of the parties hereunder which remain unperformed 
upon Closing, shall survive the Closing. 
7. Patent and Title Insurance. When the Patent has been issued by 
the State of Utah, Seller shall deliver the Patent to the Tide Company for 
recording. The Title Company shall then issue the Title Policy to Buyer. 
8. Representations, Warranties and Covenants. 
8 .1. Seller. In addition to any other representations and 
warranties contained in this Agreement, Seller makes the following 
representations and warranties, each of which (i) is material and is being relied 
upon by Buyer, and (ii) is t rue in all respects as of the date of this Agreement, 
and shall be t rue in all respects as of the Closing Date and (iii) shall survive the 
Closing and delivery of the Patent. 
8.1.1. All documents executed by Seller tha t are to be 
delivered to Buyer at Closing are, and at the Closing will be, duly authorized, 
executed and delivered by the Seller; are, and at the Closing will be, legal, valid, 
and binding obligations of Seller; and do not, and a t the Closing will not, 
breach, violate, or conflict with any provisions of any agreement to which Seller 
is a party or to which it is subject. 
8.1.2. Except as provided in the Declaration and except 
as disclosed to the Buyer in writing within five days after the date of this 
Agreement, to the best of Seller's knowledge, there are no condemnation, 
zoning, or other land-use regulation proceedings, either insti tuted or planned 
to be instituted, which would detrimentally affect the development, u s e and 
operation of the Property for its Intended Use, nor h a s Seller received notice of 
any special assessment proceedings. 
8.1.3. Seller is not involved in, nor is Seller aware of, 
any proceeding or threatened litigation, administrative or governmental 
proceeding or investigation, or pending or threatened condemnation or eminent 
domain proceeding, relating to or otherwise affecting the Property. 
8.1.4. Seller is not aware of, and has not conducted 
any studies with respect to, any Hazardous Materials located below, upon, 
about or beneath the Property. The term "Hazardous Materials" m e a n s any 
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material, substance, waste, chemical., item, or component (i) the presence of 
whirh icuuires investigation or remediation under any federal, state or local 
•• rf, regulation, ordinance or policy; or (ii) which is defined as "hazardous 
•sit/ or ""hazardous substance" under any federal, state or local statute, 
; regulation or ordinance, including without limitation, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. Section 
' • 1 5i seq,) and the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 
U.S.C. Section 6901 et seq.) and amendments thereto and regulations 
promulgated thereunder; or (iii) which is toxic, explosive or corrosive and is 
regulated by any federal, state or local governmental authority; or (iv) the 
presence of which on the Property could constitute a nuisance upon the 
Property or to adjacent property; or (v) which contains polychlorinated 
biphenyis (PCBs), asbestos or u rea formaldehyde; or (vi) which contains oil, 
petroleum, including crude oil or a fraction thereof, natural, gas, natural gas 
liquids, liquified natural gas, synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of 
natural gas and,, such synthetic gas), radon gas, ash produced by a resource 
recovery facility utilizing a municipal solid waste stream or drilling fluids and 
other wastes associated with the exploration, development or production of 
crude oil, na tura l gas or geothermal resources. 
8.2. Buyer, iiuyer represents and warrants that the signing of 
this Agreement, its delivery by Buyer to Seller, Buyer's performance and the 
transactions contemplated in this Agreement have been duly authorized by the 
requisite action on the part of Buyer, and constitute valid, and binding 
obligations of Buyer, enforceable under the terms of this Agreement. This 
representation and. warranty (i) is material and is being relied upon by Seller, 
(ii) is true in. all. respects as of the date of this Agreement and. shall be t rue in 
all respects as of the Closing Date and (iii) shall si 2 rvive the Closing and. 
delivery of th e Patent. 
9. Entry on Property- Until the Closing or until this Agreement is 
terminated, Buyer and Buyer's employees and agents shall have a limited 
license to enter upon the Property to fully investigate the Property, including 
conducting engineering studies and soils and compaction tests and testing for 
Hazardous Materials and other substances, so long as the activities do not 
materially damage the Property. Buyer shall be entitled to hire consultants , 
engineers or other third parties at its own expense to complete such studies 
and tests, provided Buyer "first delivers to Seller a waiver signed, by each such, 
third party waiving any right to file a lien against the Property for tha t third 
party's charges. Buyer shall indemnify Seller from and against any liability 
and daraage arising from Buyer's entry a nd ^h^ll repair any da mage tha t may 
have been ca used to the Property; 
1 0 As-Is Purchase. Except as set forth in Section 8.1 above, Buyer 
acknowledges that Seller makes no representations or warranties express or 
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implied with respect to the Property, and Buyer further acknowledges tha t 
Buyer is purchasing the Property on an "AS-IS* basis. 
11 . Real Estate Brokerage Commission. Buyer and Seller each 
represents and warrants to the other that it ha s had no dealings with any real 
estate broker or agent in connection with the negotiation of this Agreement or 
the consummation of the purchase and sale contemplated herein other than its 
respective broker named on the first page of this Agreement. Seller shall pay 
all brokerage commissions due Seller's Realtor by reason of this transaction. 
Buyer shall pay all brokerage commissions due Buyer's Realtor by reason of 
this transaction. Buyer and Seller do each hereby agree to indemnify and hold 
the other harmless from and against any cost, expenses or liability which may 
be claimed by any real estate broker or agent as a result of the acts or dealings 
of the indemnifying party. 
12. Attorneys' Fees. Should any party default in any of the covenants 
or agreements herein contained, tha t defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder 
or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing sui t or 
otherwise. This obligation of the defaulting party to pay costs and expenses 
includes, without limitation, all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, incurred on appeal and in bankruptcy proceedings. 
13. General Provisions. 
13.1. Entire Agreement and Amendment. This Agreement, 
including the addenda, if any, constitutes the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto relative to the subject matter hereof. Any prior negotiations, 
correspondence, or understandings relative to the subject mat ter hereof shall 
be deemed to be merged in this Agreement and shall be of no force or effect. 
This Agreement may not be amended or modified except in writing executed by 
both of the parties hereto. 
13.2. Notices. All notices or communications to be given under 
this Agreement shall be given in writing and shall be deemed given when hand 
delivered or when deposited in the mail to the address shown below of the 
party entitled to receive notice, postage prepaid, registered or certified. The 
address of either party may be changed by written notice to the other party. 
13.3. Time of the Essence. Time is of the essence in all provisions 
of this Agreement. 
13.4. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall be binding upon and 
shall inure to the benefit of Buyer and Seller and their respective heirs, 
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personal representatives, successors and assigns. This Agreement may not be 
assigned by Buyer without the prior written consent of Seller, which shall, not 
be unreasonably withheld. If an assignment by Buyer is permitted by Seller, 
Buyer shall nonetheless remain obligated under the terras of this Agreement 
for all obligations and covenants of Buyer. 
i 3.o. Applicable Law and Venue, i ins Agreement shall be 
consu ucti under the laws of the State of Utah in effect at the time of the 
signing of this Agreement. The parties consent to the jurisdiction of the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Washington County, 1 Ma] 
13.6. Interpretation. J The section headings contained in this 
£-•* '-anient axe for purposes of reference only and shall not limit, expand, or 
i/. * .;: wise affect the con.structi.on of any provisions of this Agreement. The 
exhibits and addenda, if any, attached hereto are by this reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof.. This Agreement shall not be 
construed as if it had been prepared by only Buyer or Seller, bu t rather as if 
both Buyer and Seller had prepared the same. In the event any portion of this 
Agreement shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be 
invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, such portion shall be deemed severed from 
this Agreement, and the remaining parts hereof shall remain in full force and 
effect, as fully as though such invalid, illegal or unenforceable portion had 
never been part of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller and the Buyer have executed 
duplicate originals of this Agreement as of the day and year first above 
*-.'• iV."J 
ST Paper Company, LLC 
By: ^ ^ ' l 
Its: 
Address: 
155b Uiory Kuad 
Green Bay, VT W^n* 
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Seller: 
Fort Pierce Business Park, L.C. 
By: LGJ, LC, Manager 
By: 
Gjlbert M. ^Jenru^gs" 
Manager ^ 
Address: 
335 East St. George Blvd., Suite 301 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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Exhibi t A, 
Description of Proper ty 
rhe parcel 'known as Lot 56 in the Foi t Pierce Industrial Park in St. George, 
Utah comprised of 39.293 acres and more particularly described in,, the legal, 
description and drawing attached. 
N:\SGDDCS\CE\F\Fort . 'Pierce 4090500\ST Paper\agrcement 07 l4D6.doc 
L.R. POPE ENGINEERING INC. 
1240 E100 S #15B 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84790 
1-435-628-1676 
email Irpope@infowest.com 
DESCRIPTION OF 39.278 ACRE PARCEL 
FOR PROPOSED LOT 56 
FORT PIERCE BUSINESS PARK 
Beginning at a point North 88D45'10" West 2229.44 feet along the Center Section Line and 
North 1°14'50" East 33.00 feet from the East 1/4 Corner of Section 20, Township 43 South, 
Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South 88°45'10" East 
1338.45 feet; thence North 1°15'10" East 1196.97 feet to a point on a 60.00 foot radius curve 
to the right (bearing to radius point is N 35D39'53" E); thence Northwesterly through a central 
angle of 88D58'03" and along the arc of said curve 93.17 feet; thence North 88D44'51n West 
1322.26 feet; thence South 1 D15'10" West 1279.60 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 39.278 acres 
RESERVING UNTO the State of Utah and its assigns: a 25.00 foot wide utilities and drainage 
easement along the South Boundary line and 10.00 foot wide utilities and drainage easement along the 
North, East and West Boundary lines. 
By L. Ried Pope, PE, PLS 
— 10* P.U.I 
DRAINA 
1 -:IZ SOUTh 
10' P.U.E. & 
DRAINAGE EASEMENT 
LOT 56 








26' P.U.E. & 
DRAINAGE EASEMENT 
EAST 1/4 CORNER 
SECTION 20 
1433, R15W, SLB&M 
HON NO. 276 , 
SCALE 1" = 200' 
LOT 56 
FORT PIERCE BUSINESS PARKj 
,1 ION UN! 
"1 00*45'10" V 
2?'q 4^  
E© L R. ^E ENGir, -HS & SURVEYORS 
«; .Ui. St.- 16-B, 31 Ooorge, UUh M78U 
"(ooi) oza-1078 
I ll 
Brett D. bkms (Lbti f; l n n) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK 
301 North 200 East, Suite 3A 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1627 
'Fax: (435)628-5225 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Closing Resources, LLC 
M.-DONOUGHPC 
F 
Date Jl f!\* 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHjMQTON COUNTY 
By__A 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FORT PIERCE BUSINESS PARK, L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ST PAPER COMPAN Y, JLLU, a Delaware 
limited liability company; and CLOSING 
RESOURCES, LLC, a Maryland limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
I asi Isln l ! '8? 
[ ^ f f i B r a g # ] OF: 1)!; R GRANTING 
CLOSING RESOURCES, LLC 'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR I \ ( K o F 
PERSONAJ JURF^ DICTION 
Judge Beacham 
This matfrr came befcre the Court o" ! Vfcn.1 •;•! ;•.•• .: : ;'•. r :. '\ .. i . < :: • ) 
dismiss Jor lack of personal jmisdiction on ()ctober 2.2, 2UO.S at '). >0 a.m. lie fore the HunoiaUle 
G. Rand Beacham '1 be Court, having reviewed ihc pleadings or lile heiein and good cause 
appearing, heier . gun : > 'ri -in;.: ." • • iir. i\V-.oin, - . . •<>, • ••* • •'.• '. • '• i. • .if 
personal jur isdict ion. 
D A T E D this J (;A da .• .if h W > ' , 2008 . 
B Y T I I I C O U K I 
bsi^ V - A L~£*>o Qtr--u* 
G. Rand Beacham, District Court Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TU AMI") FOP WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TORT 
S.T. 
PIERCE BUSINF^ Z^\T?K, ) 
PAPER 
Plaintiii, ) 
VS. ' ) 
COMPANY, LLC, et a1 ) 
Defendants ) 
CASE NO. 080501^88 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
OCTOBER 22, 2008 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Rusb-.-l I'. I l o u i . m UKIbllMML 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE CO! JH 
APR - 3 2009 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
BRYAN J. PATTISON 
DURHAM JONES PINEGAR 
192 EAST 200 NORTH, 3RD FLR. 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
BRETT D. EKINS 
JONES, WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
301 N. 200 E., SUITE 3-A 


























October 22, 2008. St. George, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Case number six. Fort Pierce Business 
Park L.C. vs. Saint Paper Company. Is that right? Or S.T. 
Paper Company and Closing Resources. It was a saint I never 
heard of. St. Paper. Okay. Let's see, Mr. Pattison? Are 
you Mr. Ekins? 
MR. EKINS: Correct. 
THE COURT: So, it's your motion to dismiss on behalf 
of the closing resources? 
MR. EKINS: That's right. 
THE COURT: All right. I found a memorandum of 
support, a memorandum in opposition and a reply. Was there 
anything else that I should have seen in here? 
MR. EKINS: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, I have read those. Mr. Ekins, 
anything else you want to say about this? 
MR. EKINS: Nothing beyond what I stated in the reply 
papers. Just emphasizing again the fact that Closing 
Resources has zero contact with Utah, which is undisputed, 
other than agreeing to to serve as an escrow agent in this 
transaction. And I would just again emphasize the 
administrative nature of the emails, only two of them. And 
then the letters were sent in the context of the litigation, 
which had a risk. So, they weren't sent in the context of 
the provision of escrow services necessarily. And as I read 
the case law, that's just not enough for an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pattison. 
MR. PATTISON: Your Honor, the one contact they had 
with the state of Utah is the transaction that is subject to 
litigation. Itfs property in Utah. My client's in Utah. 
They accepted to be escrow agent on a contract with a Utah 
jurisdictional clause. They are holding $80,000. They are a 
fiduciary to --
THE COURT: They are not a party to that contract. 
MR. PATTISON: Well, their names are throughout the 
contract. But when they accepted it, if you look at 
Section 1.21, that also constitutes the written escrow 
instructions of the parties. 
THE COURT: I didn't see any contract. What was 
that? 
MR. PATTISON: Your Honor, that was attached to the 
complaint. I have a copy of it here if you would like to --
THE COURT: It's attached to what? 
MR. PATTISON: I referenced it in our memo. The 
actual contract itself is attached as copies-. 
THE COURT: Oh, here. Okay. I do know what you are 
talking about then. 
MR. PATTISON: Right. 
1 THE COURT: I just didnft have my finger on it. 
2 MR. PATTISON: Okay. 
3 I THE COURT: One point what, did you say? 
4 MR. PATTISON: 1.21. It's on page 2. 
5I THE COURT: Well, I can see everything else, but I 
6 1 can't see that. 
7 1 MR. PATTISON: Maybe itfs easier if you have it 
8 highlighted up there. So, you have 1.21 references Closing 
9 Resources. Down further I think itfs the third, fourth 
10 I sentence. "This agreement, when signed, shall constitute 
11 escrow instructions to the title company and to Closing 
12 Resources." 
13 J Going further, paraphrasing, but if anything is 
14 unacceptable to Closing Resources then they should say so, 
15 essentially. They confirmed they received this contract. 
16 I Contract goes further in Section 5 to give instructions to 
17 Closing Resources what to do with the deposit in the event o 
18 a termination. And then in 6.3 directs Closing Resources 
19 1 what to do with the funds when a transaction closes. 
20 1 The case law we have cited in our memo, (inaudible) 
21 case is that once they accepted to be escrow they assumed a 
22 fiduciary responsibility to my client, a Utah corporation in 
23 a Utah transaction. That's what this case is about. It's 
24 about who is entitled to the deposit they are holding. 





is a dispute. We'll just deposit it into court and 1 
sue each other, which is essentially -- J 
THE COURT: Generally what escrow companies do, isn't 1 
MR. PATTISON: Right. Then they came back, we filed 
I don't think we yet had them served. They came back. J 





came back with a letter, Exhibit 4, basically saying we 1 
want to be escrow agent any more, so we are going to J 
this money to S.T. or -- yeah, S.T. Paper. And so, I 
s a blatant, in my view, violation of fiduciary 1 
responsibility to us. Then they show up into court on a 1 
motion to dismiss represented by the same attorney as S.T. I 
Paper where they have the fiduciary to both of us. So, J 
everything that's -- 1 
THE COURT: What is there from Closing Resources that I 
documents their agreement to do anything? I 
MR. PATTISON: They accepted the deposit and the 
correspondence. 1 
THE COURT: What evidence is there of that? 
MR. PATTISON: The emails that they sent to Chris 
Angstrom of my office. That's attached. We have Mr. 1 
Angst rom's affidavit. They accepted the deposit and the 
J agreements. That's documented. Those are the emails Mr. 
I Ekins was talking about. So, they accepted it. They 
6 
II accepted the contract. They never did anything to say we 
2 I don't want to be escrow agent any more. We don't like these 
3 1 terms. They took the deposit. They took the agreement. 
4 Those are the instructions. Now, they are trying to give the 
5 money away. If they don't want to be hailed into Utah they 
6 shouldn't have agreed to be escrow agent. 
7I THE COURT: Again, what do you have that indicates 
8 that they did agree to be hailed into Utah? 
9 MR. PATTISON: The fact that they accepted the 
10 deposit, Your Honor. They accepted the --
11 THE COURT: If I send off an order for Vermont for 
12 I maple syrup, and I send my check to Vermont and they accept 
13I it, I can sue them in Utah? 
14 MR. PATTISON: No. This is much different. They 
15 1 created a fiduciary responsibility. That's just a one time 
16 1 business transaction. 
17 THE COURT: Where is the documentation of that? 
18 MR. PATTISON: I'm sorry? 
19 THE COURT: Where is the documentation of that? Are 
20 there escrow instructions? 
21 MR. PATTISON: That's the agreement. That's what we 
22 just went over. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah. But they are not a party to the 
24 agreement. 
25 MR. PATTISON: Escrow instructions, they don't have 
to sign separately on escrow instructions. Escrow J 
instructions can be oral. They can be written. They can be 1 
in 
be 
a letter. 1 
THE COURT: If you want them to be bound you ought to 
having them sign an escrow instruction. I would never do 1 
a real estate agreement like this without having the escrow J 
company agree specifically to specific terms. 1 
the 
MR. PATTISON: When they accepted the deposit and J 
ly accepted the agreement, they held the funds pursuant to 1 
the agreement. There is no other agreement in place. That J 
was j the agreement. They were holding the funds. 1 
THE COURT: So, what was their choice? 
MR. PATTISON: Their choice was not to do anything. 1 
THE COURT: They receive it in the mail then do what, 
throw it out the window? Burn it? J 
it. 
MR. PATTISON: No. Their choice was -- 1 
THE COURT: It's got Utah jurisdiction dripping on 1 
We have to get rid of this somehow? J 
MR. PATTISON: Their choice was not to be part of the 
1 Utah transaction, Your Honor. They had a choice. 
do 
THE COURT: Well, what they are doing has nothing to 
with Utah. 
MR. PATTISON: Sure it does. The transaction is in 
Utah. 
THE COURT: It has no more to do with Utah than it 
8 
ll has to do with Alaska other than thatfs just a name on a 
2 paper. For jurisdiction in Utah you have to have something 
3 1 other than somebody in Utah sent me something. 
4 1 MR. PATTISON: We do. We have -- we are not just 
5 1 talking about throwing an email out there, exchanging a 
6 J letter with someone. We are talking about creating a 
7 fiduciary responsibility with a Utah company and a Utah 
8 1 transaction. Property in Utah. Everything here is in Utah. 
9 1 They agreed to become escrow agent, when they took the 
10I deposit, confirmed receipt of the deposit and the agreement, 
11 J which is the escrow instructions for this specific 
12 J transaction. We are not arguing general jurisdiction. This 
13 1 is specific jurisdiction. They have availed themselves. 
14 I They have contracted. They were doing business in Utah. 
15 THE COURT: Oh, hold on now. What business did they 
16 do in Utah? 
17 J MR. PATTISON: They are operating as the escrow agent 
18 1 on this transaction. 
19 THE COURT: They have never been to Utah. 
20 MR. PATTISON: That's not the test though, Your 
21I Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Well, certainly, the test is not that one 
23 1 becomes subject to a foreign state's jurisdiction just by 
24 receiving something and agreeing to do in their own facility 







MR. PATTISON: That's foreseeable that when they 
-- here's the standard out of the Fan [phonetic] case 1 
have cited. Itfs foreseeable 
duciary relationship -- they do 
fiduciary relationship with my client. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PATTISON: Itfs foreseeabl 






into Utah. That's foreseeable. 
THE COURT: Why? 
that when they created J 
n't argue there is no 1 
e. If they do 1 
t that they can be J 
MR. PATTISON: Because my client's a Utah company. 1 
a Utah transaction. They are holding a deposit. 1 
THE COURT: When I travel to Europe, that doesn't 
take Utah jurisdiction with me. 







check to a Vermont maple syrup 
11, geez, this guy's in Utah. 
think we are going to get sued 
there is something wrong with the mapl 
1 go w' 
duty 
enou 
here the maple syrup came from. I 
to 
gh 
MR. PATTISON: Well, when they 
my client on this transaction 
THE COURT: The existence of a 
to transfer jurisdiction. The 
If somebody in Europe 1 
sue them there. When I I 
provider, and they 1 
The check's from Utah. 
in Utah. No. No. If 
e syrup then I better J 
'm just not seeing it. 
created that fiduciary 1 
foreseeable --
fiduciary duty is not 
existence of a 
10 
II fiduciary duty is consistent with either jurisdiction in Utah 
2 I or wherever in the world it is that Closing Resources is 
3 located. So, the existence of a fiduciary duty is not enough 
4 for jurisdictional purposes. You have to have Closing 
5I Resources actually doing something that invokes Utah law, 
6 J that has something to do with Utah that has something other 
7 1 than we are sitting in our business, we are doing what we 
8 1 always do. Presumably with people from all over the place. 
9 J What in the world is there that makes Closing Resources think 
10 1 they have to go to Utah to litigate if somebody in Utah 
11 J complains about the escrow? 
12 MR. PATTISON: It's not just — 
13 THE COURT: Otherwise, you would have absolutely no 
14I interstate escrow agents. None. Because they would be at 
15 1 the risk of having to litigate in 51 jurisdictions for what 
16 1 they do at their home office wherever that is. 
17 1 MR. PATTISON: Your Honor, it's not just someone in 
18 1 Utah. It's their principal. It's their fiduciary. 
19 THE COURT: But that doesn't distinguish it from 
20 I their principal or fiduciary in Alaska and the one in Florida 
211 and the one in South Carolina and the one in New Mexico. And 
22 all these transactions that they might do doesn't mean that 
23 they should expect to be able to be sued from every one of 
24 those states. Not to me, it doesn't. That.'s just stretching 
25 it. That's conferring jurisdiction on the basis of what your 
client did rather than on the basis of what Closing Re 
did. And I donft think jurisdiction is something that 
of like the playground, You are it. You know, I was f 
Utah. I reached out and touched you, wherever Closing 
Resources is now. Now you are Utah. I just don't see 
that way. 
Anything else? See, this is why I was asking 
there any written closing instructions where Closing 
Resources said, okay. We received the closing instruc 
We understand this is what we are supposed to do. We 










MR. PATTISON: Your Honor, what we presented were I 
their emails saying, yes, we received these closing 
instructions. Those emails to our office in Utah, I b elieve 1 
they probably also corresponded with S.T. Paper's attorneys 1 
at Jones Waldo. We have received it. We've received the 
deposit. We've received the agreement, which is the escrow 1 
instructions. There is nothing else for them to do. 
could have said we got this stuff. We are sending it 
We don't want any part of this transaction. But they 
So, that's what this case is about, who is entitled tc 






THE COURT: But didn't you say they gave it back to 
12 
S.T. ? 
MR. PATTISON: No. That's what they are threatening 
to do. They initially said we'll just tender it into court. 
Then they sent a follow-up letter saying, you know, we are 
sick of this. We don't want to be escrow agent. We are just 
going to give it to S.T. Paper. And how they figured that 
out, when there is a dispute, that's all this case is about 
is a dispute about the 80,000. For them to just give it to 
S.T. Paper for no reason creates foreseeable harm to their 
fiduciary in Utah. 
THE COURT: That's what closing instructions would 
do. They would instruct Closing Resources and get Closing 
Resources agreement that in the event of A, this is what you 
do, in the event of B, this is what you do. 
MR. PATTISON: That's what — 
THE COURT: Then Closing Resources could agree with 
that. 
MR. PATTISON: That's what they do with article five. 
THE COURT: Article five is an agreement, is not a --
MR. PATTISON: Section 5. As I said, the law isn't 
that they have to sign off on it. The law is they accept the 
deposit. Escrow instruction ought to be written. They don't 
have to be separately signed to be bound. The simple act of 
accepting the deposit along with this agreement constitutes 
acceptance of the terms of the agreement. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you might be able to 
convince an appellate court of that, but Ifm just not 
convinced, Mr. Pattison. I think that in the kind of 
commercial environment that we have in the world, I think it 
would throw more than cold water. I think it would ice 
things' to have people who want to do interstate business, 
particularly of a service that requires no movement on their 
part, no appearance any place else on their part, simply to 
be in one location and to do a service from that one 
location, to tell them you either do it within the state of 
Maryland or you can be sued any place or anything that comes 
to your property. I just donft think thatfs consistent with 
the way the business world works now days. I think there's 
got to be more than that to subject them to Utah 
jurisdiction. Particularly where, at least from the evidence 
I have seen, they didn't go out trolling for business and 
say, please, Fort Pierce Business Park, send us some 
business. 
MR. PATTISON: My understanding on that, and Mr. 
Ekins can correct me if Ifm wrong, is that we initially 
wanted everything to be held at Southern Utah Title. And it 
was S.T. Paper who I understand has done business with 
Closing Resources before that required them to be the escrow 
agent on the deposit. 
THE COURT: Where is S.T. Paper located? Where is 
14 
1 I their --
2 MR. PATTISON: S.T. Paper, I believe, is Wisconsin, 
3 1 Your Honor. And they may have offices elsewhere. I don!t 
4 know. So, it wasn't our choice to use them. It was the 
5 other side's choice. 
6 1 THE COURT: Yeah. So, your client conceded to that 
7 for whatever bargaining reason they had? 
8 MR. PATTISON: Yes. I wasn't involved. 
9 THE COURT: Well, the other part if it is, it's not 
10 1 like your client doesn't have any place where they can go to 
11 Closing Resources. Just seems to me they ought to have to go 
12 J to Closing Resources where Closing Resources is rather than 
13 do one transaction with a foreign corporation and expect them 
14 I to come here. 
15 MR. PATTISON: Right. And I understand that. In the 
16 1 context of the concern of the parties, the litigation is 
17 here. That requires my client, the Utah company, to go 
18 elsewhere, litigate the case twice, basically, taking 
19 witnesses and everything else with them. I mean, that's 
20 another thing we have argued in our memo. This is where the 
211 litigation is. This is where it's most convenient. It's 
22 1 foreseeable, therefore --
23 THE COURT: Only for your client. It's not 
24 1 foreseeable for Closing Resources. 
25 MR. PATTISON: That's what S.T. Paper agreed to as 
15 
well. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I don't think that two emails and 
two letters regarding escrow held in Maryland constitute 
conducting business in Utah or even minimum contact. But, 
like I said, you know, appellate court might think 
(inaudible). 
MR. PATTISON: Along those lines is, we request to 
get a certification of this issue under 54B so we don't --
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. PATTISON: -- we can get some type of direction 
on that. 
THE COURT: Sure. It would be fine to do that. I'm 
going to grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
as discussed. And, certainly, I'll make certification so 
that you could get that taken care of, see if you can get 
that here. 
MR. PATTISON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, those kinds of things aside, why is 
it such a problem --
MR. PATTISON: Because they are --
THE COURT: — about who Closing Resources should 
hand the money over to? 
MR. PATTISON: Because I don't know whether we are 
going to see that money again. The underlying litigation, 
this transaction fell apart. There is a dispute about whose 
16 
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pay it into court or pay it into escrow with some really good 
instructions? 
MR. PATTISON: I wish they would do that, Your Honor. 
I suggest they do that in my memo. And they f :i ] ed a iiioti c n , 
They don't want to do that for some reason. 1 suspect it's 
because they do business with S.T. Paper. S< , • t have a 
problem with them doing that. I said in my memo if they 
deposit it into court, I would cut them loose. 
THE COURT: So, Mr. Ekins, why doesn't your client 
juot resolve this instead of arguing about jurisdiction? 
MR. EKINS: Well they very well may be willing to. 
Wllen we were named in the complaint, the instant response of 
client was let's get this dismissed based on personal 
jurisdiction grounds. Now that that's happened, I think we 
are certainly w.i I Ling to discuss options such as paying the 
money into court and seeing what happens. Because, again, 
l hi (JiopuLti has nolhjnq t n d<> u :• Closing Resources. I 
mean --
THE COURT: Yeah. If it's just a matter of who is 
going to hold the money for the litigation between the 
primary monies, I can think of all kinds of ways to solve 
that one. 
MR. EKINS: Right. I think we should be able to work 
something out. Now we are dismissed as a party I think we 
may be able to do that. 
THE COURT: Shoot. I can give you my bank account 
number. I'll get my half of a percent interest a year on it. 
MR. PATTISON: That's better than most are getting. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Yeah. I just always want to 
take a look at all the problems and see if we can 
(inaudible). And where it's just holding money --
MR. PATTISON: That's why we were surprised by the 
motion. That's what we thought it would do. We are looking 
for the complaint from them. It's just an order at the end 
of the day who they are going to give that money to. At 
least, at the point in time we filed it. That's all we ever 
wanted from them. And that's what we suggested in our 
opposition. 
THE COURT: I can see if Closing Resources offered to 
pay the money into court in Utah that would be an 
acknowledgment of jurisdiction in Utah perhaps. So --
MR. PATTISON: Of course, at that point, we wouldn't 
(inaudible) dismiss them anyway. 
18 
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§20:2 TITLE I N S U R A N C E L A W 
surance agents in most parts of the United States perform ad-
ditional closing services. These include charging all taxes and 
fees against the property that are to be paid at closing;3 prepar-
ing the instruments of conveyance called for in the purchase 
contract and other documents required to complete the transac-
tion;4 supervising the parties' execution of documents; presiding 
over the transfer of documents and funds; and recording title 
documents. In some states, allegations of the unauthorized 
practice of law limit the closing services that title insurance 
companies can provide to clerical tasks like filling in the blanks 
of a closing statement or standard form deed. See Chapter 13 
identifying states where title insurance companies are prohibited 
from supervising closings or preparing mortgages and instru-
ments of conveyance on the basis that these acts are the unau-
thorized practice of law. 
§ 20:3 Title companies' duties as escrow and closing 
agents—General duties 
An escrow or closing agent is considered to be the agent of all 
parties to the real estate transaction and, in most jurisdictions, 
bears a fiduciary relationship to each party.1 The escrowee must 
comply strictly with the instructions of the principals; if he 
3See, generally, NYCTL 1996-1 Trust v. Malihan, 276 A.D.2d 443, 715 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1st Dep't 2000); Farkas v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 71 Ohio App. 3d 
633, 594 N.E.2d 1140 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1991) (holding title insurance 
agent liable for error in prorating taxes). 
*See infra § 20:5 and cases cited therein. 
[Sect ion 20:3] 
\See West Knoxville Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 
124 F.3d 201 (6th Cir. 1997) ("An escrow holder occupies a fiduciary relation-
ship with both the parties to the escrow agreement, and has attendant duties of 
loyalty, disclosure, and care, but the particular tasks with which the escrow 
holder is charged are those set forth in the escrow agreement."); Newman v. 
Great American Mortg. Investors, 87 842 La. App. 5 Cir. 7/26/88, 1988 WL 
903143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988) ("Generally, the depositary is the agent or 
trustee of both parties . . .. It is the depository's duty to exercise ordinary skill 
and diligence, and due or reasonable care in his employment. In his fiduciary 
capacity, he must conduct the affairs with which he is entrusted with scrupulous 
honesty, skill and diligence."); Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc. v. Lawyers 
Title Ins. Corp., 492 F. Supp. 933, 941 (E.D. Ark. 1980), aflPd in part, rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 656 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1981); Mansur v. Security Search 
& Abstract Co. of Philadelphia, 1995 WL 365401 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Tucson Title 
Ins. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 Ariz. 230, 383 P.2d 119, 122 (1963); Claussen v. First 
America Title Guaranty Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 230 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (6th 
Dist. 1986); Kirby v. Palos Verdes Escrow Co., 183 Cal. App. 3d 57, 64, 227 Cal. 
20-4 
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disburses the property of the principals in violation of instruc-
tions or otherwise breaches his fiduciary duty, he is liable to the 
injured parties for breach of contract. Similarly, it is the duty of 
the escrow holder to exercise ordinary skill and diligence in his 
employment and if he acts negligently, he is liable for any loss 
proximately occasioned by such negligence.2 
Rptr. 785, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1386 (1st Dist. 1986) (disapproved of on other 
grounds by, Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co., 
27 Cal. 4th 705, 27 Cal. 4th 1160a, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 41 P.3d 548 (2002)) 
(stating that an "escrow holder is the limited agent and fiduciary of all parties 
to an escrow"); Garton v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 365, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 449, 457 (3d Dist. 1980); Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 658, 666 (4th Dist. 1963); Southern Cross Lumber & Millwork Co. v. 
Becker, 761 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988); Cano v. Lovato, 105 
N.M. 522, 734 P.2d 762, 774 (Ct. App. 1986); Williams v. Land Title Co. of 
Dallas, 1997 WL 196345, *3 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997) (not designated for publica-
tion); Zimmerman v. First American Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. 
App. Tyler 1990), writ denied, (Nov. 14, 1990). 
See also Splash Design, Inc. v. Lee, 103 Wash. App. 1036, 2000 WL 
1772519 (Div. 1 2000) (unpublished). The court found t h a t the escrowee 
breached his duty "to represent both buyer and seller neutral ly" when he 
unilaterally stopped payment on the seller's check after uncertainty arose about 
the s ta tus of certain l iens. The escrowee had argued t h a t he was following 
escrow instructions to "hold all matters in their existing status" in the case of a 
dispute. The court disagreed: 
But there was not a dispute between the parties here. And Green did more than 
merely preserve the status quo. He actively intervened in the transaction when he 
returned the purchase price to the buyer, Lee, without returning the business to the 
seller. Nothing in the escrow documents gave Green the authority to step out of the 
advisory capacity created by the instructions and intervene in the transaction . . . . 
The evidence in the record supports only one conclusion: Green's conduct breached 
his fiduciary duty. 
Contra Contawe v. Crescent Heights of America, Inc., not reported in F. 
Supp. 2d, 2004 WL 2244538 (E.D.Pa., Oct. 1, 2004); In re Johnson, 292 B.R. 821 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (Pennsylvania does not automatically recognize a fidu-
ciary relationship between the closing agent and borrower in a loan transaction 
without a showing tha t the closing agent established a special relation of t rust 
with the borrower.). Compare Davis v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 2007 WL 
782158 (N.D. Ohio 2007) in which the court stated tha t Ohio has not recognized 
a general fiduciary duty between a title insurance company and a borrower, so 
that a complaint mus t allege existence of an agency relationship or a relation-
ship involving special t rus t and confidence. The court did not decide tha t the re-
lationship of escrow or closing agent is insufficient to create a fiduciary duty, 
since the borrower's complaint failed to state whether the title company served 
in tha t role or merely issued a policy. 
2Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 785, 270 Cal. 
Rptr. 24 (3d Dist. 1990) [citations omitted]. See also Newman v. Great Ameri-
can Mortg. Investors, 87 842 La. App. 5 Cir. 7/26/88, 1988 WL 903143 (La. Ct. 
App. 5th Cir. 1988) (stating "[i]t is the depositary's duty to exercise ordinary 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West, Rel. 6, 10/2008 20 5 
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Under common law, an escrow or closing agent's fiduciary 
duties are to (i) comply with the instructions of the principals; 
and (ii) exercise ordinary skill and diligence in its employment.3 
Therefore, upon accepting a purchase contract for escrow or clos-
ing, most jurisdictions hold that a title company assumes a duty 
to follow all explicit and implied instructions for escrow and clos-
ing and to perform all services undertaken with the skill and dil-
igence reasonably expected of a real estate professional. These 
general duties apply to all the particular tasks the escrow or clos-
ing agent agrees to perform. An escrow or closing agent will be li-
able in contract for breaching any escrow or closing instructions 
and in tort for failing to exercise ordinary skill and diligence in 
skill and diligence and due or reasonable care in his employment. In his fidu-
ciary capacity, he mus t conduct the affairs with which he is ent rus ted with 
scrupulous honesty, skill and diligence"); Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 
Ariz. 230, 383 P.2d 119 (1963); Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 
528, 25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 375 P.2d 33, 35 (1962); Zang v. Northwestern Title Co., 
135 Cal. App. 3d 159, 185 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180 (1st Dist. 1982); Garton v. Title 
Ins. & Trust Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 365, 165 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-458 (3d Dist. 
1980); Axley v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 1, 151 Cal. Rptr. 
570, 574 (4th Dist. 1978), citing Lee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 
160, 162, 70 Cal. Rptr. 378 (5th Dist. 1968); Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 
3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126, 135 (3d Dist. 1974); Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 
Cal. App. 3d 824, 86 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1st Dist. 1970); National Bank of 
Washington v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973); Styrk 
v. Cornerstone Investments , Inc., 61 Wash. App. 463, 810 P.2d 1366 (Div. 1 
1991). 
In some jurisdictions, the "economic loss rule" may prevent a cause of ac-
tion in tort for breach of a closing instruction contract. See Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Hirota, not reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2007 WL 1471690 (M.D. 
Fla., 2007). But see TierOne Bank v. U.S. Money Source, Inc., 2007 WL 2904187 
(D. Neb. 2007). 
zSee cases cited supra. See also Executive Management, Ltd. v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 963 P.2d 465 (1998); Webster v. USLife Title Co., 123 
Ariz. 130, 598 P.2d 108, 111 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1979) (An "escrow agent is a 
trustee of funds deposited in escrow and must be guided in its duty by what the 
escrow agreement says and act strictly in accordance with the escrow instruc-
tions"); Southern Cross Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Becker, 761 S.W.2d 269, 272 
(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988); Bescor, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 113 111. App. 
3d 65, 68 111. Dec. 812, 446 N.E.2d 1209 (1st Dist. 1983); Williams v. Land Title 
Co. of Dallas, 1997 WL 196345, *3 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997) (not designated for 
publication) ("An escrow agent has the duty to follow the agreed terms of the 
underlying contract and the absolute duty to carry out the terms of the agree-
ment creating the escrow agency."); Rianda v. San Benito Title Guarantee Co., 
35 Cal. 2d 170, 217 P.2d 25 (1950) (stating that an escrow agent must follow the 
instructions of principals and carry out i ts duties with "reasonable skill and 
ordinary diligence"). 
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any aspect of its employment.4 
A valid underlying contract is required to support an escrow 
4See, e.g., Zimmerman v. First American Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 
694 (Tex. App. Tyler 1990), wri t denied, (Nov. 14, 1990). According to the 
purchase contract, real estate agents who arranged for the sale of 48 lots were 
to receive "free and clear" t i t le to lot 80 in lieu of a cash commission. The 
purchaser's lender informed the local title company tha t the purchaser's prom-
issory note was to be secured by a deed of t rust covering all 48 lots. The title 
company closed the sale in accordance with the information given by the lender. 
After closing, the purchaser conveyed lot 80 to the real estate agents, but lot 80 
was subject to the lender's newly created lien. In holding the title company li-
able, the Zimmerman court stated: 
The title company disregarded [the] instructions of the contracting parties and 
without disclosure to anyone created a lien on lot 80 in favor of the Lindale Bank. 
That was a significant alteration of an important provision of the agreement, and a 
breach, not only of the title company's duty to [the agents], but also of its duty to the 
buyer and seller 'to exercise due care to carry out the terms of the agreement/ 
Zimmerman v. First American Title Ins. Co 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. App. 
Tyler 1990), writ denied, (Nov. 14, 1990). 
See also Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 25 Cal. Rptr. 
65, 375 P.2d 33, 35 (1962); Ruth v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Northern Cal., 
266 Cal. App. 2d 831, 72 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1st Dist. 1968), opinion corrected, 272 
Cal. App. 2d 24, 76 Cal. Rptr. 926 (1st Dist. 1969) and (disapproved of on other 
grounds by, Hatch v. Collins, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 275 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1st 
Dist. 1990)) (holding the title company liable for breach of contract where the 
company recorded plaintiffs deed of t rus t in violation of escrow instructions 
conditioning the subordination of plaintiffs lien to a construction loan and 
failed to inform plaintiff prior to closing tha t the interest ra te for the loan did 
not comply with the interest ra te required by the escrow instructions). See also 
Jacobsen, Comment, California Escrow Agents: A Duty to Disclose Known 
Fraud? 17 Pac. L. J. 309, 315 (1985); and TierOne Bank v. U.S. Money Source, 
Inc., 2007 WL 2904187 (D. Neb. 2007) (holding mortgage originator liable to 
warehouse lender under breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and 
common law negligence for (1) submitt ing funding requests with representa-
tions and covenants containing false and inaccurate information; (2) failing to 
ensure a valid first lien on the real estate for which the loans were made; and 
(3) failing to supply eligible notes and sell the loans to third-party investors). 
The "economic loss rule" cited supra n. 2 does not eliminate tort claims by 
one contracting par ty against the other based upon torts arising from the 
contractual setting if the complaining party can show that the tort is indepen-
dent of the breach of contract. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Forest 
Investments, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc. v. Hirota, not reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2007 WL 1471690 (M.D.Fla. 
,2007) (holding that lender's allegations tha t closing agent failed to disclose sec-
ondary financing of the properties and the borrower's excessive closing cost pay-
ments supported claims for breach of closing instruction contract and Closing 
Protection Letter, but tha t the economic loss rule prevented claims for the same 
conduct under theories of negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary 
duty). 
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agreement.5 The parties to the escrow must have agreed on the 
terms that govern the escrow holder's delivery of the deposited 
items.6 The escrow agreement between the parties must be clear 
and definite.7 The parties to an escrow often give the depositary 
specific written instructions setting forth the terms for the escrow 
arrangement.8 Nevertheless, the instructions may be oral,9 
though oral instructions will not be permitted to modify written 
See West Knoxville Associates Ltd. Par tnersh ip v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 
124 F.3d 201 (6th Cir. 1997) ("An escrow agreement 'is in essence a contractual 
undertaking to assure the carrying out of obligations already contracted for/ "); 
Cloud v. Winn, 1956 OK 267, 303 P.2d 305, 308 (Okla. 1956) ("In order tha t 
[the] instrument may operate as an escrow . . . there must be a valid contract 
between the parties as to the subject mat ter of the instrument and the delivery 
. . ."); Bowles v. Key Title Co., 163 Or. App. 9, 986 P.2d 1236, 1241 (1999); 
Williams v. Land Title Co. of Dallas, 1997 WL 196345 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997) 
(not designated for publication). 
6Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860, 863, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 
205 (10th Cir. 1979); Cloud v. Winn, 1956 OK 267, 303 P.2d 305, 308 (Okla. 
1956); Williams v. Land Title Co. of Dallas, 1997 WL 196345 (Tex. App. Dallas 
1997) (not designated for publication). 
7Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860, 863, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 
205 (10th Cir. 1979); Cloud v. Winn, 1956 OK 267, 303 P.2d 305, 308 (Okla. 
1956); Williams v. Land Title Co. of Dallas, 1997 WL 196345 (Tex. App. Dallas 
1997) (not designated for publication). But see Lechner v. Hailing, 35 Wash. 2d 
903, 216 P.2d 179, 185 (1950). A court may, however, consider parol evidence if 
the terms of the escrow are not clear. The Lechner court stated: 
When there is a deposit of instruments, allegedly in escrow, and conflict in the 
testimony as to the understanding of the parties relative to the conditions of the de-
posit, it is proper for the court to inquire into the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the transaction, in order to determine first, whether the parties intended a true 
conditional delivery, and second, whether they were in agreement as to the nature of 
the conditions, performance of which would authorize the depositary to convey to the 
grantee. 
Lechner v. Hailing, 35 Wash. 2d 903, 216 P.2d 179, 185 (1950). 
8See Vandeventer v. Dale Const. Co., 277 Or. 817, 562 P.2d 196 (1977); 
Cloud v. Winn, 1956 OK 267, 303 P.2d 305, 308 (Okla. 1956) (citing C.J.S., page 
1200 § 6); Williams v. Land Title Co. of Dallas, 1997 WL 196345 (Tex. App. 
Dallas 1997) (not designated for publication) ("an escrow agreement customarily 
is a writ ten instrument containing a carefully drawn list of instructions tha t 
defines the duties of the escrow agent"). 
9Claussen v. First America Title Guaranty Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 230 
Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (6th Dist. 1986); Zang v. Northwestern Title Co., 135 Cal. 
App. 3d 159, 185 Cal. Rptr. 176, 181 (1st Dist. 1982); Cano v. Lovato, 105 N.M. 
522, 734 P.2d 762, 774 (Ct. App. 1986); Williams v. Land Title Co. of Dallas, 
1997 WL 196345 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997) (not designated for publication), citing 
Simpson v. Green, 231 S.W. 375, 377 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921). 
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instructions.10 Instructions also may be implied from the express 
instructions given to the escrow holder.11 
Courts generally require strict compliance with escrow 
instructions.12 Any change to the terms of the escrow after de-
10Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 205 
(10th Cir. 1979); Osborn v. Grego, 226 Kan. 212, 596 P.2d 1233 (1979); Katie-
man v. U. S. Communities, Inc., 197 Neb. 443, 249 N.W.2d 898 (1977). 
"Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 375 
P.2d 33, 35 (1962) (stating tha t an escrow agent will be liable for breaching an 
escrow instruction "that it had contracted to perform or . . . a n implied promise 
arising out of the agreement with the buyer or seller"); Kirk Corp. v. Firs t 
American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 785, 270 Cal. Rptr. 24 (3d Dist. 1990) 
(holding tha t the recordation of a cancellation of lease was not a breach of the 
escrow agent's duties where the recordation of such cancellation was implied 
from the escrow instructions); Claussen v. First America Title Guaranty Co., 
186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 230 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (6th Dist. 1986). 
12See Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 25 C a l Rptr. 65, 
375 P.2d 33, 35 (1962); Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 
785, 270 Cal. Rptr. 24 (3d Dist. 1990); Garton v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 106 Cal. 
App. 3d 365, 165 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457 (3d Dist. 1980) ("An escrow holder bears a 
fiduciary relationship to each party to the escrow and must comply strictly with 
the instructions of the principals . . .. If an escrow holder violates the instruc-
tion liability attaches for breach of contract."); Diaz v. United California Bank, 
71 Cal. App. 3d 161, 139 Cal. Rptr. 314, 321 (2d Dist. 1977); Commonwealth 
Land Title Ins. Co. v. Leidner, 169 A.D.2d 699, 564 N.Y.S.2d 187 (2d Dep't 
1991); Styrk v. Cornerstone Investments, Inc., 61 Wash. App. 463, 810 P.2d 
1366 (Div. 1 1991) ("When the required debt/appraisal ratio was not met . . ., 
the escrow agent could not close the transaction in full compliance with his 
instructions"); Newman v. Great American Mortg. Investors, 87 842 La. App. 5 
Cir. 7/26/88, 1988 WL 903143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (stating t ha t the 
escrow holder "must act strictly in accordance with the instructions and terms 
of the escrow agreement and is liable for departures therefrom"); Webster v. 
USLife Title Co., 123 Ariz. 130, 598 P.2d 108, 111 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1979); Fretz 
v. First American Title Ins. Co., 161 Ariz. 174, 777 P.2d 672 (Ct. App. Div. 1 
1989). In Fretz, the purchase agreement provided that Misztal would pay part 
of the purchase price in cash at closing and give the seller a promissory note for 
the remaining amount, secured by a deed of trust. A local office of First Ameri-
can Title Insurance Company was the escrow and closing agent for the sale and 
the trustee under the deed of trust . The purchase agreement also provided that 
the agents' commission was to be treated as a separate escrow and be paid as 
follows: (i) 50% upon closing of the first 8 acres of the tract; and (ii) 50% upon 
closing of the remaining 9 acres. The escrow agreement for the sale included a 
provision obligating the seller to direct the trustee under the deed of t rust to 
use all proceeds to satisfy seller's obligations with respect to the land. 
The agents received 50% of their commission at the closing for the first 8 
acres, which occurred in March of 1985. The purchaser defaulted on his balloon 
payment for the 9-acre parcel and the seller instructed First American to initi-
ate a trustee's sale. First American wired the proceeds of the sale directly to the 
seller without payment of the remaining commissions to the agents. The agents 
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posit with the escrow holder must be approved by all principals 
to the escrow.13 Once deposited in escrow, an instrument passes 
beyond the control of the depositor and the depositor may not 
recall it.14 Unless all parties agree to modify escrow instructions, 
the escrowee must implement the original instructions received, 
even if one party directs the escrowee otherwise.15 An oral in-
sued for payment of the commissions, claiming tha t First American violated the 
escrow instructions for the sale transaction. First American argued the escrow 
instructions for the purchase transaction were only applicable if the purchaser 
made the required balloon payment and tha t it had received the sale proceeds 
in its capacity as trustee, not as escrow agent. An Arizona s ta tu te discussing 
the distr ibution of proceeds from a t rustee 's sale provided t h a t the t rus tee 
should apply proceeds, first, to the costs and expenses of exercising the power of 
sale; second, to the payment of the contract secured by the t rus t deed; and, 
third, to payment of all other obligations provided in or secured by the t rus t 
deed. 
The court held tha t the language in the escrow instructions obligating 
the trustee to discharge the seller's obligations with respect to the land con-
trolled. "[0]nce Fi rs t American came into possession of the proceeds of the 
trustee's sale, it was required by its escrow instructions to pay the balance of 
appellee's commissions out of those proceeds before forwarding the remainder to 
[seller]." Fretz v. Firs t American Title Ins. Co., 161 Ariz. 174, 777 P.2d 672, 
673-674 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1989). This case suggests tha t compliance with the 
escrow instructions takes precedence over other obligations of the escrow holder 
tha t are related to the transaction. 
Newman v. Great American Mortg. Investors , 87 842 La. App. 5 Cir. 
7/26/88, 1988 WL 903143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (holding tha t a change to 
the escrow agreement pu r suan t to the request of one par ty bu t without the 
other party's knowledge constituted a breach of the escrow holder's fiduciary 
duty); Gattozzi v. Midland First American Nat. Title, 2000 WL 1369890 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2000) (unpublished); Ogdahl v. Title Ins. & 
Trust Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 41, 140 Cal. Rptr. 148 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 
1977) (disapproved of on other grounds by, Contemporary Investments, Inc. v. 
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 999, 193 Cal. Rptr. 822 (4th Dist. 1983)) 
(holding that sellers could not unilaterally rescind escrow instructions); Wade v. 
Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 824, 86 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1st Dist. 
1970) ("After written instructions signed by each party are deposited with the 
escrow holder, neither can change his instructions without the concurrence of 
the other"). See also Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 Ariz. 230, 383 P.2d 119 
(1963) (commenting that an "escrow agent is held to strict compliance with the 
terms of the escrow agreement, and is liable for all damages resulting from any 
deviation."). 
14Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860, 863, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 
205 (10th Cir. 1979); Cloud v. Winn, 1956 OK 267, 303 P.2d 305, 309 (Okla. 
1956); Newman v. Great American Mortg. Investors, 87 842 La. App. 5 Cir. 
7/26/88, 1988 WL 903143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Lechner v. Hailing, 35 
Wash. 2d 903, 216 P.2d 179, 185 (1950). 
15See Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 
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quiry as to the status of the escrow does not constitute an amend-
ment to the escrow instructions.16 
Upon performance of the conditions set forth in the escrow 
agreement, the escrow holder must deliver the deposited items in 
accordance with the escrow instructions.17 If an escrow agent is 
unsure of its instructions, it is obligated to seek clarification of 
such instructions before proceeding.18 Thus, where escrow instruc-
205 (10th Cir. 1979); Katleman v. U. S. Communities, Inc., 197 Neb. 443, 249 
N.W.2d 898 (1977); Newman v. Great American Mortg. Investors, 87 842 La. 
App. 5 Cir. 7/26/88, 1988 WL 903143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Gattozzi v. 
Midland First American Nat. Title, 2000 WL 1369890 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga County 2000) (unpublished); Lacy v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 
781 (Tex. App. Dallas 1990), writ granted, (Nov. 28, 1990) and writ denied with 
per curiam opinion, 803 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1991) and writ withdrawn, (Jan. 30, 
1991); Dickens v. First American Title Ins. Co. of Arizona, 162 Ariz. 511, 784 
P.2d 717 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1989); Ogdahl v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 72 Cal. App. 
3d Supp. 41, 140 Cal. Rptr. 148 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1977) (disapproved of by, 
Contemporary Investments, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 999, 
193 Cal. Rptr. 822 (4th Dist. 1983)) (holding that sellers could not unilaterally 
rescind escrow instructions) Compare Osborn v. Grego, 226 Kan. 21 2, 596 P.2d 
1233(1979). 
16Claussen v. First America Title Guaranty Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 230 
Cal. Rptr. 749, 754 (6th Dist. 1986) (holding tha t an inquiry by one party to the 
escrow regarding the status of funds on deposit did not constitute an instruction 
to hold closing pending receipt of expected funds). The Claussen court also 
noted that it is not customary to turn an inquiry into an instruction. Claussen 
v. First America Title Guaranty Co., 186 Cal App. 3d 429, 230 Cal. Rptr. 749, 
754 (6th Dist. 1986). 
™See Newman v. Great American Mortg. Investors, 87 842 La. App. 5 Cir. 
7/26/88, 1988 WL 903143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Lechner v. Hailing, 35 
Wash. 2d 903, 216 P.2d 179, 185 (1950). 
™See Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of California, 168 Ariz. 345, 813 P.2d 
710 (1991) (holding tha t "unless it should be determined from the evidence that 
the par t ies intended to give the Tower lien uncondit ional priority, Ticor 
breached its contractual obligations by giving Ticor priority without obtaining 
clarification before proceeding."); Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co., 220 
Cal. App. 3d 785, 270 Cal. Rptr. 24 (3d Dist. 1990) (stating tha t an escrow 
holder is obliged to take corrective steps before obeying questionable instruc-
tions); Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 185 Cal. 
App. 3d 1149, 230 Cal. Rptr. 276, 278 (1st Dist. 1986); Diaz v. United California 
Bank, 71 Cal. App. 3d 161, 139 Cal. Rptr. 314, 321 (2d Dist. 1977); Spaziani v 
Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. 1963). 
See also Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 100 Idaho 555, 602 P.2d 
53, 58 (1979) (holding tha t an escrowee violated the terms of the escrow by fail-
ing to request clarification of the parties , rights). In the Suitts case, the Suitts 
were going to p u r c h a s e proper ty , ca t t le and farm equ ipmen t from the 
McMurtreys over a period of time. A land sale contract, bill of sale, warranty 
deed from the McMurtreys to the Suitts, and a quitclaim, deed from the Suitts 
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tions were silent as to the terms of a first deed of trust to which 
the seller agreed to subordinate the purchaser's purchase-money 
deed of trust, the title company could be liable for effecting the 
transfer without first determining the seller's intentions.19 
back to the McMurtreys were placed in an escrow account a t Firs t Security 
Bank. The purchase contract provided tha t the documents in escrow would be 
delivered to the Suitts upon payment of the purchase price. The escrow contract 
contained a provision that allowed the escrow holder to withhold delivery and 
decline to make further payments until the rights, powers and duties under the 
escrow contract were settled between the parties or by final judicial action. 
Prior to complete payment of the purchase price, disputes arose between 
the parties concerning the legal description for the land and an easement. The 
Suitts filed a suit ("first case") to settle these disputes. The trial court ruled in 
the Suitts favor, holding that the property description should be reformed and 
t h a t an obstruction in the easement mus t be removed. The McMurtreys im-
mediately appealed the trial court's decision. While the appeal was pending, the 
Suitts tendered the remainder of the purchase price to First Security. First Se-
cu r i t y accepted t h e p a y m e n t and t e n d e r e d i t to t h e M c M u r t r e y s . The 
McMurtreys refused to accept the payment. First Security notified both parties 
tha t it was holding the escrow at status quo until the rights, duties and powers 
of the parties became finally determined by judicial action. Suitts v. First Sec. 
Bank of Idaho, N.A., 100 Idaho 555, 602 P.2d 53, 55 (1979). 
The Suitts then commenced a second action ("second case") against First 
Security and the McMurtreys for wrongful failure to deliver the escrow docu-
ments . The Idaho Supreme Court determined in the appeal of the second case 
that , under the escrow agreement, if the escrow holder was going to withhold 
delivery, the holder must also refuse to accept further payments . The court 
reasoned, "it was incumbent upon First Security to take affirmative steps to 
seek clarification of its duties under the escrow agreement." Suitts v. First Sec. 
Bank of Idaho, N.A., 100 Idaho 555, 602 P.2d 53, 58 (1979). The second par t of 
the clause in the escrow contract allowing the escrow holder to obtain clarifica-
tion of the parties' rights by judicial action, in the court's opinion, contemplated 
the escrow holder filing an interpleader action. "The responsibility of the escrow 
holder to seek clarification of its duties under the terms of the escrow was not 
satisfied by merely holding the escrow in limbo while it awaited the outcome of 
an appeal in an action brought by the part ies to determine their r ights and 
duties under the sales contract." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 100 
Idaho 555, 602 P.2d 53, 58-59 (1979). 
19The California Court of Appeals held in Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 
2d 667, 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. 1963) tha t an escrow agent's failure to 
clarify its instructions prior to closing the escrow could be a breach of its fidu-
ciary duties. In Spaziani, the plaintiff obtained a real estate broker's assistance 
in selling two adjoining pieces of land improved with rental homes. The broker 
was unable to sell the lots but informed the plaintiff tha t he wanted to purchase 
the lots. The plaintiff told the broker tha t she would "throw in" two additional 
unimproved lots located behind the listed lots if the broker purchased the same. 
The broker agreed to purchase the property for $22,000 by "securing a first deed 
of t rus t for approximately $10,000 on the front portion of the land where the 
houses were located" and he "would give her $2,000 down and she would carry 
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A failure to do something not required by I hi1 instructions is 
the second trust deed back for the difference of I the] purchase price." Spaziani 
v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 660 (4th Dist. 1963). The bro-
ker alleged tha t he told the plaintiff t ha t he wanted the rea r portion of the 
property free and clear in anticipation of developing such property. 
Shortly after the parties agreed to the above terms, the brokii pit parvd 
a deposit receipt agreement tha t provided as follows* 
$2,000 down Balance $20,000 payable $120 per mo including 6% interest subordinated 
to a $10,000 trust deed payable $120 mo incl. 6% with release of 120 x 150 with ease-
ment to Holly St. Trust deed to be divided on each property proportionately— Buyer 
pay escrow. Interest at 6% per annum on unpaid portion of the purchase price to be 
included in the prescribed payments and possession given close of escrow. 
Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661 (4th Dist. 1963). 
The plaintiff signed the deposit receipt agreement and the broker took it 
to a title company for preparation of escrow instructions in accordance with the 
agreement. The escrow instructions provided tha t a first deed of t rust would be 
for a construction loan and tha t a second deed of t rus t would be given to the 
plaintiff. The instructions provided further tha t both deeds of trust were limited 
to the south portion of the property containing the rental homes. The broker 
subsequently obtained a loan for "purchase assistance" from Arrowhead Savings 
and Loan Association. When a loan officer from Arrowhead read the escrow 
instructions he noticed tha t the first deed of t rus t referred to a construction 
loan. The loan officer called the title company to inquire about the matter and 
was told tha t the construction loan referred to a different obligation. Without 
obtaining any further direction from the plaintiff, the title company proceeded 
to close the transaction. 
After mak ing t h r e e p a y m e n t s on his loan obligat ions, the broker 
defaulted. Arrowhead ins t i tu ted foreclosure proceedings and the plaintiff 
brought suit against the title company for negligence and fraud. After discuss-
ing the fiduciary duties of an escrow holder, the court concluded: 
In the case at bar, there was evidence from which the trial court could have found 
that the escrow holder proceeded to effect a transfer of the plaintiffs title to [the bro-
kerl without determining her intention with respect to the terms of the first deed of 
trust to be placed against that property which was to take precedence over the deed 
of trust securing payment to her of the balance of the purchase price, and from the 
facts it also could have found that the escrow holder was negligent in the discharge of 
its duty to exercise due skill and diligence in the performance of its agreement with 
the plaintiff. In substance, the action of the escrow holder in causing recordation of 
the deed from the plaintiff to [the broker] without instructions from her respecting 
the terms of the deed of trust which was to precede that given as security for pay-
ment of the purchase price balance, amounted to an exercise of authority without first 
determining the conditions under which that authority might be exercised or, stated 
otherwise, constituted a disposition of the plaintiff's property without instructions in 
the premises because the instructions given were meaningless. 
Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 677, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. 1963). 
See also Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of California, 168 Ariz. 345, 813 P.2d 
710 (1991) (holding tha t "unless it should be determined from the evidence tha t 
the par t ies in tended to give the Tower lien uncondit ional priority, Ticor 
breached its contractual obligations by giving Ticor priority without obtaining 
clarification before proceeding."). 
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not a breach of the escrow agreement or a breach of contract.20 
The California Court of Appeals held that "no liability attaches to 
the escrow holder for his failure to do something not required by 
the terms of the escrow or for a loss incurred while obediently fol-
lowing his escrow instructions."21 This should not be taken to 
mean, however, that a title company serving as escrow and clos-
ing agent has no duty to take the initiative to inform parties of 
facts material to the transaction or to act in compliance with 
common real estate practices when the parties reasonably rely on 
the company's having assumed the role of real estate professional 
for the transaction. A title company agreeing to act as closing 
agent may be liable in tort for failing to exercise ordinary skill 
and care in any aspect of managing the closing of the transac-
tion, including, but not limited to, drafting instruments of convey-
ance, supervising the execution of instruments, supervising the 
transfer of documents and funds, and recording title documents.22 
The title company also must be able to identify a situation be-
For example, in Axley v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 1, 
151 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 (4th Dist. 1978), the California Court of Appeals held 
tha t a title company serving as escrowee was not liable for failing to point out 
tha t an amendment to the transaction diminished the seller's security. See also 
Siegel v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 46 Cal. App. 4th 1181, 1194, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 84 (2d Dist. 1996). 
21
 Axley v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 1, 151 Cal. Rptr. 
570, 574 (4th Dist. 1978). 
See In re Opinion No. 26 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 
139 N.J. 323, 654 A.2d 1344, 1362 (1995): 
Any broker participating in a transaction where buyer and seller are not represented 
should have the experience and knowledge required at least to identify a situation 
where independent counsel is needed. Under those circumstances the broker has a 
duty, in accordance with the standards of the profession, to inform either seller or 
buyer of that fact. Presumably, the same duty applies to any title officer . . . who 
becomes aware of the need of either party for independent counsel. In addition to 
whatever potential action might be taken by the bodies that regulate brokers and 
title officers, as well as by their own associations, their failure to inform exposes them 
to the risk of civil liability for resulting damages. . .. Not only did the escrow instruc-
tions state that Title Insurance was to record all papers, the normal exigencies of the 
situation called for them to do so. The act of recording is in their line of business—a 
normal part of their duties, not an exception. Part of the expectancies of ordinary lay-
men . . . is that the escrow agent will record the necessary documents. 
Allen v. Webb, 87 Nev. 261, 485 P.2d 677, 681 (1971): 
Title Insurance orally promised to record [the trust deedl and the eminence, experi-
ence and knowledge of Title Insurance in its field is that of handling the minutiae of 
real estate closings. From their superior knowledge flowed a duty to their clients . . . 
to do such things as recording documents or advise them when they did not. Theirs is 
the knowledge of a lawyer. In fact, they acted the part in preparing the documents. 
Accord Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., Inc., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 
254, 264 (1976) (holding that , because title companies now perform a service 
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yond its expertise and advise the seller or buyer when they should 
consult an independent attorney.23 If the title company proceeds 
with a complex transaction, it assumes the duty to exercise the 
skill and care of a real estate professional able to manage such a 
transaction.24 See infra §§ 20:4, 20:5. 
§ 20:4 Title companies ' dut ies as escrow and clos ing 
agents—Duty to disclose and inform 
A title insurance company tha t serves as escrow and closing 
agent has a fiduciary duty to communicate knowledge of material 
facts acquired in the course of its agency to its principals.1 Facts 
material to the parties to the escrow include title matters, fraud, 
tha t was formerly provided by attorneys, their standard of care is equivalent it) 
the s tandard of care expected of attorneys). See, generally, Morley v. J Page I 
Realty and Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (Div. 2 1976). 
23See J n re Opinion No. 26 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 
139 N.J. 323, 654 A.2d 1344, 1362 (1995); Allen v Webb, 87 Nev„ 261, 485 P 2d 
677, 681 (1971). 
24See In re Opinion No. 26 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 
139 N.J . 323, 654 A.2d 1344, 1362 (1995); National Bank of Washington v. 
Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973); Allen v. Webb, 87 Nev. 
261, 485 P.2d 677, 681 (1971). 
[Section 20:4] 
1See West Knoxville Associates Ltd. Par tnership v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 
124 F.3d 201 (6th Cir. 1997) ("An escrow holder occupies a fiduciary relation-
ship with both the parties to the escrow agreement, and has at tendant duties of 
loyalty, disclosure, and care . . .."); Home Loan Corp. v. Texas American Title 
Co., 191 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2006), reh'g overruled, (May 
18, 2006) and review denied, (June 1, 2007); Diaz v. United California Bank, 71 
Cal. App. 3d 161, 139 Cal. Rptr. 314, 320 (2d Dist. 1977); Spaziani v. Millar, 
215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. 1963) ("The obligation of 
an escrow holder to disclose to his principal information acquired by him in the 
course of his employment must be viewed in the light of the fiduciary relation-
ship existing between them"). See also Sanders v. Park Towne, Ltd., 2 Kan. 
App. 2d 313, 578 P.2d 1131, 1135 (1978); Cano v. Lovato, 105 N.M. 522, 734 
P.2d 762, 774 (Ct. App. 1986); Williams v. Land Title Co. of Dallas, 1997 WL 
196345 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997) (not designated for publication). 
Compare Contawe v. Crescent Heights of America, Inc., not reported in F. 
Supp. 2d, 2004 WL 2244538 (E.D.Pa. 2004); In re Johnson, 292 B.R. 821 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2003) (Pennsylvania does not automatically recognize a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the closing agent and borrower without a showing tha t the 
closing agent established a special relation of t rust with the borrower.) See also 
Davis v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 2007 WL 782158 (N.D. Ohio 2007), holding 
that Ohio has not recognized a general fiduciary duty between a title insurance 
company and a borrower, but not determining whether a fiduciary duty would 
exist if the plaintiff had alleged that the title insurance company was serving as 
escrow and closing agent. The court held tha t whether the ti t le insurance 
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